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Abstract
In the aftermath of financial crises governments can use economic policy to min-
imise the risk of future recurrence. Yet not all do so. To explain this divergence
in responses I develop a theory of economic policy choice after financial crises. I
argue that past financial crises provide information to future governments about the
political costs of financial crises. This subsequently informs the need to use eco-
nomic policy to insure against such crises. Focusing on the accumulation of foreign
exchange reserves after currency crises, I find that when past currency crises led to
political changes future governments accumulate higher levels of reserves to pre-
vent another crisis from occurring. This effect is stronger when political change
occurred in situations where governments would not expect to be held accountable,
and when reserve sales were shown to be effective in preventing political change.
The theory and empirical results provide an answer as to why countries experi-
encing a similar form of financial crisis can nevertheless vary in their attempts to
prevent future recurrence.
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1 Introduction
With deepening integration into the global economy, governments are subject to in-
creased economic volatility. While flows of international capital provide opportunities
for receiving international investment, they render possible sudden capital outflows and
speculative attacks that can have severe economic consequences. In addition, growing
trade openness leaves countries’ economies vulnerable to economic downturns in major
trade partners.
A central question in comparative and international political economy is how govern-
ments respond to and manage these issues of economic openness and its associated
volatility. It is well established that domestic politics play a considerable role. The par-
tisanship of governments (Quinn and Inclan, 1997; Kastner and Rector, 2005) and the
role of veto players (Kastner and Rector, 2003) have previously been found to impact
countries’ capital account openness. Moreover the role of domestic financial interests
have long been considered important in understanding how governments react to the
rise of global capital (Frieden, 1991). Additionally, financial crises which have be-
come more frequent with greater economic openness, are often a driver of changes in
economic policy (Drazen and Grilli, 1993; Drazen and Easterly, 2001; Biglaiser and
DeRouen, 2004; Abiad and Mody, 2005).
In this paper I argue that in addition to these factors, a government’s past political expe-
riences affect incentives to use economic policy to reduce exposure to the pressures of
economic globalisation. Governments form expectations about the political outcomes
of failing to prevent economic shocks from the outcome of previous shocks. When a
government lost political power during the previous crisis, future governments have a
stronger expectation that a similar fate would occur if they too oversaw such a crisis. As
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a result governments use economic policy to insure against this possibility. Moreover,
previous events provide information about the efficacy of policies in preventing political
change, as well as whether political accountability conforms to expectations.
To analyse how political change during past financial crises influences governments’
attempts to protect against international capital movements, I focus on the use of foreign
exchange reserve accumulation in the aftermath of currency crises. In the years after the
spate of currency crises in the 1990s, the large scale accumulation of reserves became
a prominent feature of the global economy. Reserve holdings are worth approximately
30% of developing countries’ GDP (Rodrik, 2006). Furthermore, this accumulation
occurred at a higher level than expected given macroeconomic fundamentals of those
countries (Edison, 2003) suggesting other, political, concerns in the accumulation of
reserves.
The empirical analysis of this paper lends support to the theory outlined above. Gov-
ernments accumulate higher levels of reserves when previous currency crises resulted
in political change. Moreover, the conditions surrounding the previous currency crisis
influence the effect of this information. Governments further increase reserve accumu-
lation when political change occurred in situations where governments would not expect
to be held accountable, such as currency crises that did not have negative economic out-
comes and regional currency crises. In addition, when reserve sales were effective at
preventing political change during previous currency crises, future governments con-
tinue accumulating reserves.
This paper contributes to the existing literature in three ways. First, it offers an expla-
nation of why some governments, in spite of recently undergoing a financial crisis, still
put themselves in the position of being vulnerable to the possibility of a future currency
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crisis or speculative attack. This complements existing work on governments’ ability
and credibility in attempting to prevent currency crises (Leblang, 2003; Chiu and Wil-
lett, 2009; Steinberg and Malhotra, 2014). Moreover it emphasises that governments’
expectations of the consequences of currency crises are important to take into consider-
ation, much like the importance attached to the expectations of investors and speculators
in previous research (Leblang and Satyanath, 2005).
Second, it adds to the literature on how financial crises induce governments to make
changes in economic policy (Drazen and Grilli, 1993; Drazen and Easterly, 2001; Biglaiser
and DeRouen, 2004; Abiad and Mody, 2005) and in particular the use of capital con-
trols during crises (Haggard and Maxfield, 1996; Pepinsky, 2012). This prior research
typically examines how the existence of a crisis leads to changes in economic policy.
In this paper I further contribute to understanding the role of crises in changing eco-
nomic policy, by disentangling how previous currency crises differ in the information
they provide to future governments. By examining political change and the conditions
surrounding it, this paper offers a new explanation as to why governments who have re-
cently experienced a similar form of economic crisis nevertheless respond with different
economic policies.
Third, the paper adds to literature on the relationship between currency crises and polit-
ical turnover. Previous literature has focused on how political changes affect the beliefs
of speculators, subsequently increasing the likelihood of a currency crisis (Leblang and
Satyanath, 2005; Bernhard and Leblang, 2008; Leblang and Satyanath, 2008). Con-
versely this paper looks at how currency crises influence political survival, which in turn
affects governments’ expectations about the political costs of currency crises. This pro-
vides further understanding of the link between financial crises and political change.
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The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section I outline a political theory of eco-
nomic policy choice in the aftermath of a financial crisis, with a focus on the case of
reserve accumulation after currency crises. Section three describes the data used for the
empirical tests in subsequent sections. Section four tests the hypotheses derived from
the theory and conducts robustness tests on time-series cross-sectional data from 1970
to 2007. The final section offers concluding thoughts.
2 A Political Theory of Economic Policy Choice After Financial Crises
Whilst countries can choose economic policy to ensure economic stability in the af-
termath of a financial crisis, not all do so. To explain this divergence of responses, I
focus on how governments whose countries experienced similar crises can learn differ-
ent lessons. I assume governments are opportunistic. Therefore the effect of a crisis
upon political survival is of primary importance. Although governments believe that
citizens will attribute some amount of blame towards an incumbent presiding over a
crisis, they are uncertain about its exact magnitude.
More explicitly, I focus on the case of accumulating foreign exchange reserves after
currency crises. Governments accumulate reserves as a form of insurance against cur-
rency crises. A substantial body of empirical research has found that large holdings
of reserves decrease the likelihood and severity of currency crises (Berg and Patillo,
1999; Edison, 2000; Goldstein, Kaminsky, and Reinhart, 2000; Bussie`re et al., 2014).1
1In contrast first-generation currency crisis models imply that currency crises are driven by specula-
tive attacks related to governments’ unsustainable fiscal policy (Krugman, 1979; Flood and Garber, 1984),
suggesting reserves in and of themselves do not prevent currency crises. Nevertheless, large stocks of re-
serves give governments time to reform unsustainable fiscal policy in the event of an attack. In addition,
second-generation models (Obstfeld, 1986) allow for multiple equilibria, with self-fulfilling expectations
being one such equilibrium. Therefore reserve accumulation can be a signal of a governments’ willing-
ness to prevent a currency crisis, as well as be a part of a government’s ability to defend the currency as
in Leblang (2003).
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Furthermore large stocks of reserves buy governments time to implement reforms nec-
essary to improve fiscal policy. Therefore reserves can be useful in maintaining political
survival, by allowing governments to gradually implement reforms and build a political
consensus behind such reforms in the event of a currency crisis.
Governments do not necessarily know ex-ante whether or not a currency crisis will
result in loss of political power. Instead governments rely upon their expectation of
the probability of removal from office, given the occurrence of a currency crisis. The
more likely it is that citizens will attribute blame to the government for the occurrence
of a currency crisis, the greater the incentive for the government to insure themselves
through reserve accumulation to prevent this.
2.1 Political Change During Previous Currency Crises
When forming an expectation of the likelihood of losing political power during a finan-
cial crisis, the events of previous financial crises can provide information. An important
source of information is the political experience of past governments during previous
currency crises. By observing whether a government lost political power during the
previous currency crisis, governments update their beliefs on the probability of removal
were a currency crisis to occur. In cases where a past government lost political power
as a result of a currency crisis, future governments have a stronger belief that a future
currency crisis will also result in a loss of political power. In contrast, governments who
observe that the past currency crisis did not lead to a loss of political power will have a
weaker belief that a future currency crisis will result in losing political power.2
Differing beliefs in the probability of removal from office were a currency crisis to
2It is also possible that governments can learn from other countries’ experiences during currency
crises. For an exploration of mechanisms for learning from other countries’ political experiences see
(McGrath, 2015).
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occur, result in differing levels of reserve accumulation. Governments have a greater
incentive to avoid currency crises, and thus insure themselves through reserve accu-
mulation, when their expectation of losing political power in the event of a currency
crisis increases. Consequently governments in countries where a previous currency cri-
sis resulted in political change, will hold larger stocks of foreign reserves. For these
governments who believe a currency crisis will result in a loss of political power, the
opportunity cost of reserve accumulation is of little importance. In contrast, govern-
ments in countries where a previous currency crisis resulted in no political change will
be less likely to increase reserve accumulation. This is because the benefits of crisis pre-
vention are lower, due to a lower belief in the probability of removal from office in the
event of a crisis. Consequently the opportunity costs of preventing a crisis through re-
serve accumulation are higher. The preceding discussion leads to the following testable
hypothesis:
H1: If political change occurred during a previous currency crisis, then subsequent
governments accumulate more foreign reserves.
In addition, conditions surrounding the onset and outcome of a previous currency crisis
can also provide relevant information to governments. Whether a crisis was domestic or
regional, implies how responsible a government was for a currency crisis. The change
in GDP during a currency crisis, suggests how damaging the currency crisis was for
citizens. These two aspects entail different mechanisms of political accountability for
currency crises, which are discussed below. Importantly, past crises will be particu-
larly informative to governments when they do not align with expected mechanisms of
accountability.
Governments will expect the likelihood of losing political power to be lower when other
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countries in a region area also experiencing currency crises. This is because it is less
clear that domestic policies were the determinant of the crisis. When observing that
many countries are undergoing currency crises, individuals benchmarking their govern-
ment’s performance will attribute less blame to the government than if the country was
the only one experiencing such a crisis.3 As a result governments have a stronger ex-
pectation of being held accountable when a currency crisis occurs domestically and not
in combination with other countries in the region.
Furthermore the economic outcomes of the currency crisis are related to political ac-
countability. When currency crises lead to large declines in GDP, governments expect
to be held politically accountable for allowing the crisis to occur. This is because such
a crisis entails economic harm upon citizens. In contrast, a currency crisis that does not
lead to such negative economic conditions would not be expected to lead to political
costs, as individuals within the country are less affected.
Given these prior expectations of accountability, governments observe the events of the
previous currency crisis. When political change occurs that runs counter to these ex-
pectations, future governments will further update their expectations related to political
change in the event of a currency crisis. If political power was lost in spite of the fact
that multiple crises were occurring, then governments learn that regional currency crises
are also politically costly. Therefore their expectation of losing political power from a
currency crisis increases, as they no longer believe that only domestic crises lead to
losing political power. Similarly if the previous government lost political power when
the currency crisis did not have negative economic effects, then governments learn that
there are additional negative political effects of currency crises independent of the eco-
3This logic is similar to that of Kayser and Peress (2012)
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nomic component. In this case the very occurrence of a crisis acts as a possible signal
of incompetence. Thus governments perceive the likelihood of losing political office in
the event of a currency crisis to be higher.
This information, which informs governments’ beliefs about the political costs of cur-
rency crises, affects the incentives for governments to insure against future crises. This
leads to the following testable hypotheses:
H2: The effect of political change upon future reserve accumulation increases when
the number of currency crises in other countries that occurred at the same time in-
creases.
H3: The effect of political change upon future reserve accumulation is stronger the
better the economic outcomes of the previous currency crisis.
2.2 The Efficacy of Reserves to Prevent Political Change
So far I have argued that political change during previous currency crises, and the con-
ditions surrounding the crisis, lead to an increased expectation of losing political power
were a currency crisis to occur again. Therefore governments insure themselves against
the possibility by accumulating foreign exchange reserves.
This however leaves unanswered the question of why governments would specifically
choose reserve accumulation to insure themselves, rather than other policies. A pos-
sible answer is that governments can also learn from previous currency crises about
the efficacy of reserves for preventing political change. Specifically, governments can
learn about the efficacy of reserve sales by observing the extent to which reserves were
spent during the previous crisis. This, in combination with whether the crisis resulted
in political change, provides information on the effectiveness of reserve accumulation.
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Reserves become an attractive option if they are expected to be effective at preventing
political change during a crisis, in addition to their established effectiveness in prevent-
ing currency crises.
Observing political change during a previous currency crisis leads governments to form
different expectations of the benefits of reserve accumulation, when taking into account
reserve sales during the previous crisis. If the previous currency crisis involved large
sales of reserves yet still resulted in political change, then future governments will as-
sess the use of reserves to be ineffective. Thus whilst reserves may still be useful for
preventing the occurrence of a crisis, they will be judged less useful for surviving a cri-
sis were one to occur. As a result the incentive to increase reserve accumulation will
decrease.
Governments can consider two pieces of information about the role of reserves dur-
ing previous currency crises: the stock of reserves before the crisis and the proportion
of reserves spent during the crisis. When pre-crisis levels of reserves are large then
high proportions of reserve sales that do not prevent political change should lead future
governments to doubt the efficacy of reserves. Thus governments will not have an in-
centive to increase reserve accumulation in the future. In contrast, the lesson learned
will be different when initial levels of reserves were small. In this case a high propor-
tion of reserve sales coupled with political change does not necessarily imply reserves
are ineffective. Rather, it can imply that the pre-crisis level of reserves was insufficient.
Therefore, governments will have a greater incentive to increase reserve accumulation
in order to avoid loss of political power in the future. This leads to the following testable
hypothesis:
H4: When the amount of reserves spent during the previous crisis and pre-crisis levels
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of reserves increase, the effect of political change decreases.
2.3 The Costs and Constraints of Reserve Accumulation
Whilst reserve accumulation can prevent the occurrence and severity of currency crises,
it is not costless. The economic cost of accumulating reserves will determine the de-
gree to which a government is able to accumulate reserves. Notably, foreign exchange
reserves are typically held in currency deposits and bonds, with the US Dollar being
the dominant reserve currency (Edison, 2003). As a result the ratio of the interest rate
offered for US bonds to the domestic interest rate is an important determinant for the
cost of reserve holding.
Countries’ economic conditions affect incentives to accumulate reserves. If the interest
rate on domestic deposits is higher than US bonds, then the opportunity cost of reserve
accumulation is higher. The money spent on holding reserves receives a lower rate of
return than if it were invested domestically. Governments in this situation, who may
wish to accumulate reserves after learning that currency crises are politically costly,
will be constrained. In contrast, when interest rates on US bonds are relatively higher
investment in reserves has a higher rate of return than domestic investment, reducing the
opportunity cost of reserve accumulation. Therefore governments who wish to insure
against future currency crises by accumulating reserves are less constrained. This leads
to the following testable hypothesis:
H5: As interest rates on US bond yields become larger relative to domestic deposit
rates, countries who experienced political change during previous currency crises will
accumulate larger levels of reserves than those who did not.
Moreover governments can face institutional constraints on their ability to accumulate
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reserves. Central bank independence is of importance, as reserves are typically held by
central banks. Therefore the extent to which a government is able to pursue large scale
reserve accumulation is constrained by the independence of the central bank. With
independent central banks, political influences on reserve accumulation are removed.
Therefore the political outcomes of previous currency crises should not influence fu-
ture reserve accumulation in the presence of an independent central bank. In contrast,
a non-independent central bank allows governments to both over and under accumulate
foreign reserves. Consequently, if a previous currency crisis resulted in loss of politi-
cal power, governments with non-independent central banks are easily able to increase
reserve holdings. Governments with non-independent central banks will also be less
likely to accumulate reserves if there was no political change, compared to those with
independent central banks. This is because those governments will have less incentive
to accumulate reserves, and be unconstrained by a central bank that would be adverse to
under-insuring against possible future crises. This leads to the testable hypothesis:
H6: The effect of political change during previous currency crises is stronger the weaker
the level of central bank independence.
3 Research Design
3.1 Dependent Variable
The dependent variable of interest in this paper is the ratio of foreign exchange reserves
to months of imports. This measure is used as the effectiveness of reserves as insurance
against currency crises is dependent upon the amount of imports they are able to cover
(Edison, 2003; Rodrik, 2006; Gallagher and Shrestha, 2012). Data on the number of
months of imports covered by foreign exchange reserves are taken from the World De-
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velopment Indicators (World Bank, 2013). As this variable exhibits heavy positive skew
I use the natural logarithm of the ratio of reserves to months of imports, which better
approximates a normal distribution and has weaker skew.4
3.2 Key Independent Variables
In operationalising the key independent variable of political experience during previous
currency crises, I use two measures of political turnover during previous currency crises
from the Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive (Banks and Wilson, 2013). The
first variable is a count of major cabinet changes. This variable is defined as a new
premier being named and/or 50% of cabinet posts being assumed by new ministers.5
The second variable is a count of changes of effective executive. This is defined as
changes in effective control of executive power. For a change to be coded as having
taken place the new executive must be independent of the previous executive. As this
variable explicitly requires independence from the previous executive this can be seen
as a stronger measure of political turnover than the major cabinet changes variable.6
These variables are summed individually over the currency crisis years as a measure
of the level of political turnover during the currency crisis, and are entered separately
into the estimations. Both variables are entered as binary variables, indicating whether
that form of political change occurred during the previous currency crisis. 7 A possible
4Figure 8 in the appendix shows the distribution of the ratio of reserves to months imports. The mean
of reserves in months of imports is 3.5 with a standard deviation of 3.1. Descriptive statistics for all
variables can be found in table 2 in the appendix.
5Unfortunately the raw data that comprises this variable are not included in the data, thus sensitivity
to the 50% threshold can not be assessed.
6These variables in the Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive are ‘polit11’ and ‘polit12’ respec-
tively.
7This is done because for both variables the modal observation is that no change occurred during
previous currency crises. In addition if political change does occur during a previous currency crisis, it
is typically only one major cabinet change or change in effective executive. For this reason I transform
these variables to be binary variables, indicating whether that form of event took place during the previous
currency crisis. Doing so ensures that the results are not driven by particular cases with large numbers
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concern with this measure is that governments may not learn much about the probability
of political survival if there was a change in institutional structure since the past currency
crisis. Therefore I also create a version of this variable weighted by similarity in the
current political system and the system that oversaw the onset of the currency crisis as
defined by the combined polity 2 score (Marshall and Jaggers, 2010).8
To measure whether the currency crisis was purely domestic, or in conjunction with
other countries, I use data from Reinhart and Rogoff (2009). I create a variable that
counts the number of countries within a given country’s region that experienced a cur-
rency crisis in the same year as the given country.9
To measure the economic severity of the previous currency crisis, I use data on GDP
from the World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2013). For cases where there
was no political change, this is defined as the difference between the level of GDP in
the year prior to the crisis and the minimum level of GDP during the currency crisis , as
a proportion of the level of GDP prior to the crisis. For cases where there was political
change, this is defined as the difference between the minimal level of GDP during the
crisis before the political change occurs and the level of GDP in the year prior to the
crisis, as a proportion of the level of GDP prior to the crisis. This variable is interpreted
as the maximum decline in GDP as a result of the currency crisis.
of political turnover, such as Argentina in 2001. Figure 9 in the appendix shows the distribution of
observations for each variable during previous currency crises
8More formally the weight, w, is defined as w = 1/(1+ |(xi− x j)|) where xi is the current combined
polity 2 score, and x j is the combined polity 2 score at the start of the previous currency crisis. The
combined polity 2 score ranges from zero (fully autocratic) to twenty (fully democratic). The binary
indicator variables that measure whether there was political change or not during a previous currency
crisis are then multiplied by this weight. This variable receives a value of one if there was political change
during the previous currency crisis and the current political system is the same as that of the system when
the crisis occurred, and monotonically decreases toward zero the more dissimilar the systems.
9Regions are defined through the use of Correlates of War codes, see table 10 in the appendix.
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To operationalise reserve sales during the pervious currency crisis I use data on the value
of reserves (excluding gold) in current US Dollars from the World Development Indica-
tors (World Bank, 2013). I create a variable that is the maximum proportion of reserves
spent during currency crises, taking into account the year when political change took
place. Therefore I construct this variable in the same manner as the severity of the eco-
nomic crisis outlined above. This variable is interpreted as the maximum response that
the government made during the crisis. The variable is theoretically bounded below at
-1 (all reserves spent) and values above zero indicate that reserve levels were increased
during the crisis.
To measure the cost of reserves I use data on interest rates for domestic deposit rates
and 10 year US bonds. As in previous research (Edison, 2003) the cost is defined as the
difference between the real interest rate for domestic deposits and the interest rate on 10
year US bonds. Thus negative values indicate that the interest rate on 10 year US bonds
is larger than that for domestic deposits. Data on the nominal domestic deposit rate and
the inflation (CPI) rate used for creating the real interest rate are taken from the World
Development Indicators (World Bank, 2013). Data for the interest rate on 10 year US
bonds are taken from the FRED dataset (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System (US), 2014).
Central bank independence is measured using the level of turnover in central bank gov-
ernors, a common proxy in the literature. As in Plu¨mper and Neumayer (2011) I use
the square root of the number of irregular turnovers in the past five years, multiplied by
−1 so that a value of zero indicates central bank independence and decreasing values
indicate decreasing central bank independence. The data for this comes from Dreher,
Sturm, and de Haan (2010).
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3.3 Control Variables
For other independent variables I follow and add to the specification of Edison (2003).
Edison (2003) notes that there are three categories of economic factors that influence
foreign exchange reserve accumulation. First, as a country’s economic size increases,
international transactions are also likely to increase resulting in a greater need for for-
eign exchange reserves. Thus countries’ GDP per capita and population size are in-
cluded. These data are collected from the World Development Indicators (World Bank,
2013). Related to this aspect, countries that run current account surpluses will be uncon-
sciously accumulating reserves. Therefore I include data on a country’s current account
balance (as a percentage of GDP) using data from the World Development Indicators
(World Bank, 2013). Second, more open economies are likely to have higher current
account variability, thus resulting in higher reserve holdings to offset this. Data on the
level of imports as a percentage of GDP, are included to capture this. These data are col-
lected from the World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2013). Third, higher levels
of capital account openness result in a higher susceptibility to financial crises as well
as greater possibility of capital flight, thus increasing the demand for foreign exchange
reserves. To capture this the Chinn-Ito index, measuring capital account openness, is
used (Chinn and Ito, 2008). Fourth, countries with pegged exchange rates typically
need greater levels of reserves in order to maintain these pegs. I use data from Reinhart
and Rogoff (2004), which classifies historical exchange rate regimes. Using this data I
create a binary variable, which takes the value of one if a country has a pre-announced
or de facto peg or crawling peg, and zero otherwise.10
To account for the level of international involvement in the previous currency crisis
10De facto and crawling pegs are coded as having a value of 2 or less in the coarse annual data.
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I include a binary variable which indicates whether there was an IMF program that
lasted for at least 5 months during the previous currency crisis. This is important as a
common conjecture for the large scale reserve accumulation in South East Asia after
the currency crisis in the late 1990s was dissatisfaction with international involvement.
This data comes from Midtgaard, Vadlamannati, and Soysa (2014). Finally to measure
the extent to which governments are accountable to the general population, and thus
likely to wish to avoid bad economic outcomes, I include the combined polity 2 score
(Marshall and Jaggers, 2010), which measures the level of democracy, and a binary
variable indicating whether the political system is a presidential system or not from the
Database of Political Institutions (Beck et al., 2001).
3.4 Sample
This paper is concerned with the behaviour of governments in terms of foreign exchange
reserve accumulation after experiencing a currency crisis. Hence I restrict the sample
to countries that have experienced a currency crisis. Data on the occurrence of currency
crises come from Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), who define a currency crisis as a depre-
ciation of 15% or more against the US Dollar or another relevant anchor currency in a
given year. A country first enters the sample the first year after a currency crisis episode
occurs and remains until the end year of available data. If a country experiences another
currency crisis within this time frame, the indicator of whether political change occurred
is updated. In order to capture differing dynamics in reserve accumulation during cur-
rency crises, a binary indicator for whether there is currently a currency crisis or not is
included in all estimations. This process repeats for the number of currency crises that
a country experiences during the time period of the available data. The original sample
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Figure 1: The difference over time in the mean reserve holdings for countries who
experienced political change during the previous currency crisis and those who did not.
Points indicate the difference in means, vertical lines indicate 95% confidence intervals.
covers the time period of 1970 to 2007.11
3.5 Estimation
The main statistical estimator used in this paper is fixed effects regression, which is
used to account for unobserved time invariant unit heterogeneity. In order to account
for temporal dependence in the level of reserves I include a lagged dependent variable,
as well as a linear time trend.12
Before presenting the results of the estimation, I display descriptive statistics related to
the main result of the paper. Figure 1 displays the difference in the average levels of
reserves for countries who experienced any form of political change during a currency
11This is a similar approach to research on how concessions during previous civil wars affects the risk
of future recurrence (Walter, 2006; Forsberg, 2013). Further discussion of possible issues to do with this
sample definition and a table (table 9) illustrating sampling are located in the appendix.
12This is similar to the empirical model of Edison (2003), however differs as I also use a lagged
dependent variable and a linear time trend to account for temporal dependence.
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crisis to those who did not, for the time period after the previous crisis. We can see
that countries who experienced political change have approximately 1 month worth of
imports more reserves than those who did not for the first two years after experiencing
the crisis. As a common rule of thumb for insuring against exogenous shocks is three
months of imports (Edison, 2003; Rodrik, 2006; Gallagher and Shrestha, 2012), politi-
cal change leads to governments accumulating approximately one third of this amount
more than cases of no political change, a considerable amount. This is in line with the
implications of the theory. Political change during previous currency crises lead to sub-
sequent governments accumulating foreign exchange reserves. Over time this difference
between countries decreases, becoming negligible eight years after the crisis.
4 Results
Table 1 shows the effects of political change during currency crises upon the level of
foreign exchange reserves.13 Models 1 and 2 test the unconditional effects of past major
cabinet changes and changes in effective executive respectively, weighted by the simi-
larity between the current political system and the system when the crisis occurred. For
both major cabinet changes and changes in effective executive there is a positive and
statistically significant coefficient. Previous currency crises that led to political change
are thus associated with increased levels of reserves in subsequent years, supporting the
implications of the theory.14
13For reasons of space I focus on the political change variables that are weighted by similarity in
political system. Results for the unweighted variables are located in the appendix, and are similar to their
weighted counterparts.
14As the estimation includes a lagged dependent variable, the coefficients upon all other variables are
contemporaneous effects. Figure 10 in the appendix shows the long run effect of political change during
previous currency crises, over a ten year period calculated in the manner suggested by Williams and
Whitten (2012). Over the simulated period major cabinet changes lead to an approximate increase of
reserves by one month worth of imports, changes in effective executive lead to an approximate increase
of reserves by one month and a half of imports.
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Figure 2: The marginal effect of political change upon reserve accumulation, condi-
tional upon the number of currency crisis onsets in the same region at the start of the
previous currency crisis. The dashed lines indicate 95% confidence intervals. Tick
marks display the marginal distribution for the (jittered) number of currency crisis on-
sets in the same region at the start of the previous currency crisis.
I next turn to assessing whether the number of currency crises in a region during the
previous currency crisis affects the lessons governments learn about political change
during currency crises. Figure 2 displays the marginal effect of political change during
the previous currency crisis conditional upon the number of countries simultaneously
experiencing an onset of a currency crisis.15 In line with hypothesis 2, the results show
that the effect of political change upon reserve accumulation increases when the cur-
rency crisis was part of a regional episode rather than a domestic occurrence. Political
change when there were multiple currency crises has a stronger effect in these cases as
governments would expect to not be held accountable for such a regional crisis. Whilst
15Calculated from models 3 and 4 in table 1.
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the value of zero is not contained within the confidence intervals when four other coun-
tries experienced a currency crisis at the same time as the previous crisis, the confidence
intervals overlap at all points along this conditioning variable. Thus there is only mod-
erate support for the interaction effect.
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Figure 3: The marginal effect of political change upon reserve accumulation, condi-
tional upon the change in GDP during the previous currency crisis. The dashed lines
indicate 95% confidence intervals. Tick marks display the marginal distribution for the
change in GDP during the previous currency crisis.
Figure 3 displays the marginal effect of political change during the previous currency
crisis, conditional upon the proportional change in GDP.16 The results provide some
support for hypothesis 3. The effect of political change upon subsequent reserve accu-
mulation increases the less severe economic outcome of the crisis was. This suggests
that governments learn that currency crises have negative implications for political sur-
vival, beyond the effect of the crisis upon economic conditions. In contrast political
16Calculated from models 5 and 6 in table 1.
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change matters little for reserve accumulation when the currency crisis had negative
economic outcomes. This suggests that future governments, independent of the politi-
cal outcomes, invest in reserve accumulation to avoid such economic outcomes in the
future. However the statistical significance of this interaction effect is only moderate
due to overlapping confidence intervals in the case of changes in effective executive.
Nevertheless the confidence intervals do not include zero when the economic outcomes
during the crisis were sufficiently positive (above 0.05).
I now move on to exploring hypothesis 4, which says that governments’ are more likely
to accumulate reserves after currency crises if the expenditure of reserves led to previous
governments’ retaining political power. Figure 4 displays the marginal effect of political
change dependent upon the proportion of reserve sales and whether pre-crisis reserves
were at a low or a high level.17
Figure 4 shows that when the previous currency crisis led to political change, in spite
of large levels of reserve sales, governments do not increase reserve accumulation. This
is because the political purpose of reserve accumulation is perceived to be ineffective,
thus there is less incentive for a government to further accumulate reserves. However
there is a positive effect of political change upon future reserve accumulation when
pre-crisis reserves were low. When the previous currency crisis exhibited both political
change and high reserve sales, future governments are more likely to accumulate re-
serves. Whilst the previous government may have spent a large proportion of reserves,
the low pre-crisis level of reserves indicates that this entailed a low absolute level of
17To do so I use the 10th percentile in the sample as a low pre-crisis level of reserves (approximately
1.1 months of imports) and the 90th percentile in the sample as a high pre-crisis level of reserves (approx-
imately 6 months of imports). These marginal effects are based on the results of the models 7 and 8 in
table 1. The estimation excludes outliers defined by the thirteen observations above the 99th percentile for
the reserves spent during the previous crisis variable, as there exist observations that are approximately 6
standard deviations above the mean.
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Figure 4: The marginal effect of political change upon reserve accumulation, condi-
tional upon the proportion of reserves spent during the previous currency crisis and the
pre-crisis level of reserves. The shaded polygon indicates 95% confidence intervals. A
high level of pre-crisis reserves is approximately 6 months of imports (the 90th per-
centile), whilst a low level of pre-crisis reserves is approximately 1.1 months of imports
(the 10th percentile). Tick marks display the marginal distribution for the proportion of
reserves spent during the previous currency crisis.
sales. Therefore when political change occurs this informs future governments that
further reserves need to be accumulated. In contrast, in the cases where there was no
24
political change the level of reserves would not be considered too low, therefore leading
to a lower level of reserve accumulation than when political change occurs.
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Figure 5: The marginal effect of political change upon reserve accumulation, condi-
tional upon the difference between the real domestic interest rate and the interest rate
on 10 year US bonds. The dashed lines indicate 95% confidence intervals. Tick marks
display the marginal distribution for the difference between the real domestic interest
rate and the interest rate on 10 year US bonds.
I now examine the implications related to the cost component in the choice of reserve
accumulation. In line with hypothesis 5, figure 5 displays the marginal effect of previ-
ous political change for a range of values of the interest rate differential.18 The results
suggest that when the cost of holding reserves is low, political change during previ-
ous currency crises leads to greater reserve accumulation than when the cost of holding
reserves is higher. However this interaction effect is not statistically significant at con-
ventional levels.
18These marginal effects are computed using the estimates displayed in models 9 and 10 in table 1.
The marginal effects are displayed for the 1st to 99th percentile for ease of presentation.
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Figure 6: The marginal effect of political change upon reserve accumulation, condi-
tional upon the degree of central bank independence. The dashed lines indicate 95%
confidence intervals. Tick marks display the marginal distribution for the degree of
central bank independence.
Finally figure 6 displays the effect of political change during previous currency crises
upon reserve accumulation, conditional upon the degree of the central bank indepen-
dence.19 The direction of the effect is line with hypothesis 6, with decreased central
bank independence governments are freer to accumulate reserves leading to a stronger
response to previous political change. However the substantive size is small and the
confidence levels overlap at all points. This suggests that these constraints play a small
role in influencing governments’ ability to change economic policy in response to the
political outcomes associated with currency crises.
19These marginal effects are computed using the estimates displayed in models 11 and 12 in table 1.
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4.1 Robustness
I also implement a series of robustness checks, to assess the sensitivity of the effect
of political change during previous crises to alternative model specifications. For rea-
sons of space the full details of the robustness tests are presented in the appendix.20
In summary the main results on the association between political change and reserve
accumulation are robust to all the robustness tests performed. This is also the case for
the results on how the circumstances of the previous currency crisis, multiple crises in
a region and the economic severity of the crisis, condition the effect of political change.
In model specifications for the efficacy of the reserve sales during the previous currency
crisis the results are robust for major cabinet changes; however they are less robust for
changes in effective executive. In contrast the model specifications for the costs and
constraints of reserve accumulation are much less robust. Results are not stable across
all robustness tests for the conditioning effect of real interest rates, and there are changes
in the direction of coefficients in the central bank independence specification for four of
the robustness tests.
5 Conclusion
The aftermath of financial crises can often lay bare the costs associated with the in-
creasing role of international capital movements in domestic economies. Yet govern-
ments often vary in their choice of economic policy to respond to these pressures. In
this paper I develop a theory to explain the variation in governments’ decisions to use
20The robustness tests are: allowing the effect of previous political change to be dependent upon the
amount of time since the last currency crisis, learning from the entire crisis history, accounting for un-
dervalued exchange rates, alternative operationalisation of the dependent variable, region fixed effects,
accounting for sample selection with Heckman selection models, accounting for exchange rate fluctu-
ations, increasing the window for which political change is attributed to the previous currency crisis,
controlling for the length of the previous currency crisis, and the use of an Error Correction Model.
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economic policy to prevent future economic shocks. Governments can learn the po-
litical cost of failing to prevent such shocks by observing previous political outcomes.
When the previous economic shock resulted in loss of political power, future govern-
ments are more likely to use economic policy to prevent future recurrence. In addition
if the previous crisis possessed features that would lead governments to expect not to be
held accountable politically, then the occurrence of political change further leads to the
use of economic policy to insure against these shocks in the future. Governments also
learn from previous crises the efficacy of economic policy to prevent political change,
determining the use of that specific policy in the future.
This theory was applied to the accumulation of foreign exchange reserves after cur-
rency crises, an economic policy that can both reduce the likelihood and severity of
currency crises. In line with the implications of the theory, governments accumulate
larger amounts of reserves when past currency crises led to governments losing political
power. This implies that the extent to which governments respond to potential economic
instability, due to increasing globalised economies, is dependent upon their expectation
of the political costs of failing to do so. Consequently, the effect of political change
is stronger when past governments are held accountable in cases where governments
would not expect to be held to account: regional crises and crises that did not have
negative economic outcomes. Furthermore, when reserves are shown to be effective in
preventing political change during previous currency crises future governments tend to
hold higher levels of reserves than otherwise.
The findings contribute to our understanding of why governments differ in their use
of economic policy to manage the volatility associated with the rise in global capital
mobility. Existing research has largely focused on how the existence of a crisis leads
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to changes in economic policy (Drazen and Grilli, 1993; Drazen and Easterly, 2001;
Biglaiser and DeRouen, 2004; Abiad and Mody, 2005). This paper furthers our under-
standing of these processes by disentangling how different features of the past currency
crisis can lead to differences in governments post-crisis behaviour. That two govern-
ments can learn different lessons from a past currency crisis, dependent on both the
existence and nature of political change during such a crisis, provides an interesting in-
sight into understanding heterogenous responses. These differences can also shed light
on the specific choices of policies used to manage this volatility. When a particular
policy is shown to be effective then it is more likely to be used in the future, leading to
policies that are substitutes being used less frequently.
Whilst this paper deals with the case of reserve accumulation after currency crises, the
theoretical approach is sufficiently general to be applied to other areas of interest. In
particular, the theoretical approach is well suited to cases where governments are un-
certain about the political costs of failing to insure against the increased volatility from
economic integration. Therefore future research, using this approach to examine dif-
ferent forms of crises and their associated policy responses, could offer new insights
into how governments vary in their responses to economic openness. Furthermore, this
paper provides a bridge between two separate literatures on the political outcomes of fi-
nancial crises (Chwieroth and Walter, 2010; Crespo-Tenorio, Jensen, and Rosas, 2014)
and the literature on changes in economic policy induced by financial crises (Drazen
and Grilli, 1993; Drazen and Easterly, 2001; Biglaiser and DeRouen, 2004; Abiad and
Mody, 2005). Future research on the intersection of these two literatures, can provide
further understanding of the interdependence between economic policy choices and po-
litical outcomes.
29
References
Abiad, Abdul, and Ashoka Mody. 2005. “Financial Reform: What Shakes It? What
Shapes It?” American Economic Review 95: 66 – 88.
Author. 2014. “Protection From Your Neighbour’s Fate: The Diffusion of Reserve
Accumulation Policies.” Working Paper .
Banks, Arthur S., and Kenneth A. Wilson. 2013. Cross-National Time-Series Data
Archive. Databanks International: Jerusalem, Israel.
Beck, Thorsten, George Clarke, Alberto Groff, Philip Keefer, and Patrick Walsh. 2001.
“New Tools in Comparative Political Economy: The Database of Political Institu-
tions.” World Bank Economic Review 15(September): 165–176.
Berg, Andrew, and Catherine Patillo. 1999. “Are Currency Crises Predictable? A Test.”
IMF Staff Papers 46(June): 107 – 138.
Bernhard, William, and David Leblang. 2008. “Cabinet Collapses and Currency
Crashes.” Political Research Quarterly 61(3): 517–531.
Biglaiser, Glen, and Karl DeRouen. 2004. “The Expansion of Neoliberal Economic
Reforms in Latin America.” International Studies Quarterly 48: 561 – 578.
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (US). 2014. “10-Year Treasury
Constant Maturity Rate [DGS10], retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St.
Louis.” https://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/DGS10/.
Bussie`re, Matthieu, Gong Cheng, Menzie D. Chinn, and Noe¨mie Lisack. 2014. For a
Few Dollars More: Reserves and Growth in Times of Crises. Working Paper 19791
National Bureau of Economic Research.
Chinn, Menzie, and Hiro Ito. 2008. “A New Measure of Financial Openness.” Journal
of Comparative Policy Analysis 10(September): 309 – 322.
Chiu, Eric M. P., and Thomas D. Willett. 2009. “The Interactions of Strength of Gov-
ernments and Alternative Exchange Rate Regimes in Avoiding Currency Crises.” In-
ternational Studies Quarterly 53(DEC): 1001–1025.
Chwieroth, Jeffrey M., and Andrew Walter. 2010. “Financial crises and political
turnover: a long run panoramic view.” Working Paper .
Crespo-Tenorio, Adriana, Nathan M. Jensen, and Guillermo Rosas. 2014. “Political
Liabilities: Surviving Banking Crises.” Comparative Political Studies 47(7): 1047–
1074.
Drazen, Allan, and Vittorio Grilli. 1993. “The Benefit of Crises for Economic Reforms.”
American Economic Review 83: 598 – 607.
30
Drazen, Allan, and William Easterly. 2001. “Do Crises Induce Reform? Simple Empir-
ical Tests of Conventional Wisdom.” Economics and Politics 13: 129 –158.
Dreher, Axel, Jan-Egbert Sturm, and Jakob de Haan. 2010. “When is a Central Bank
Governor Replaced? Evidence Based on a New Data Set.” Journal of Macroeco-
nomics 32: 766–781.
Edison, Hali J. 2000. “Do Indicators of Financial Crises Work? An Evaluation of an
Early Warning System.” International Finance Discussion Paper No. 675 .
Edison, Hali J. 2003. “Are Foreign Exchange Reserves in Asia too High?” In World
Economic Outlook: Public Debt in Emerging Markets. International Monteary Fund
pp. 76 – 92.
Flood, Robert P., and Peter M. Garber. 1984. “Collapsing exchange-rate regimes : Some
linear examples.” Journal of International Economics 17(August): 1–13.
Forsberg, Erika. 2013. “Do Ethnic Dominoes Fall? Evaluating Domino Effects of
Granting Territorial Concessions to Separatist Groups.” International Studies Quar-
terly 57(2): 329–340.
Frieden, Jeffry A. 1991. “Invested interests: the politics of national economic policies
in a world of global finance.” International Organization 45(4): 425 – 451.
Gallagher, Kevin P., and Elen Shrestha. 2012. “The Social Cost of Self-Insurance:
Financial Crisis, Reserve Accumulation, and Developing Countries.” Global Policy
3(November): 501 – 509.
Goldstein, Morris, Graciela L. Kaminsky, and Carmen M. Reinhart. 2000. Assessing Fi-
nancial Vulnerability: An Early Warning System for Emerging Markets. Washington:
Institute for International Economics.
Haggard, Stephan, and Sylvia Maxfield. 1996. “The political economy of financial
internationalization in the developing world.” International Organization 50(12): 35–
68.
Heston, Alan, Robert Summers, and Bettina Aten. 2012. “Penn World Table Version
7.1, Center for International Comparisons of Production, Income and Prices at the
University of Pennsylvania.”.
Kastner, Scott L., and Chad Rector. 2005. “Partisanship and the Path to Financial Open-
ness.” Comparative Political Studies 38(5): 484–506.
Kastner, S.L., and C. Rector. 2003. “International Regimes, Domestic Veto–Players,
and Capital Controls Policy Stability.” International Studies Quarterly 47(1): 1.
31
Kayser, Mark Andreas, and Michael Peress. 2012. “Benchmarking across Borders:
Electoral Accountability and the Necessity of Comparison.” American Political Sci-
ence Review 106(8): 661–684.
Krugman, Paul R. 1979. “A Model of Balance-of-Payments Crises.” Journal of Money,
Credit and Banking 11(3): 311–25.
Leblang, David. 2003. “To Devalue or to Defend? The Political Economy of Exchange
Rate Policy.” International Studies Quarterly 47(4): pp. 533–559.
Leblang, David, and Shanker Satyanath. 2005. “Institutions, Expectations and Currency
Crises.” International Organization 60(1): 245 – 262.
Leblang, David, and Shanker Satyanath. 2008. “Politically generated uncertainty and
currency crises: Theory, tests, and forecasts.” Journal of International Money and
Finance 27(3): 480 – 497.
Marshall, M.G., and K. Jaggers. 2010. Polity IV Project: Political Regime Charac-
teristics and Transitions, 1800 - 2010. College Park, MD: Center for International
Development and Conflict Management, University of Maryland.
McGrath, Liam F. 2015. “Protection From Your Neighbour’s Fate: The Diffusion of
Reserve Accumulation Policies.” Working Paper .
Midtgaard, Trude M., Krishna Chaitanya Vadlamannati, and Indra Soysa. 2014. “Does
the IMF cause civil war? A comment.” The Review of International Organizations
9(1): 107–124.
Obstfeld, Maurice. 1986. “Rational and Self-fulfilling Balance-of-Payments Crises.”
American Economic Review 76(March): 72–81.
Pepinsky, Thomas B. 2012. “Do Currency Crises Cause Capital Account Liberaliza-
tion?” International Studies Quarterly 56(3): 544–559.
Plu¨mper, Thomas, and Eric Neumayer. 2011. “Fear of Floating and de Facto Exchange
Rate Pegs with Multiple Key Currencies1.” International Studies Quarterly 55(4):
1121–1142.
Quinn, Dennis P., and Carla Inclan. 1997. “The Origins of Financial Openness: A
Study of Current and Capital Account Liberalization.” American Journal of Political
Science 41(3): 771–813.
Reinhart, Carmen M., and Kenneth Rogoff. 2009. This Time Is Different: Eight Cen-
turies of Financial Folly. Princetion, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Reinhart, Carmen M., and Kenneth S. Rogoff. 2004. “The Modern History of Ex-
32
change Rate Arrangements: A Reinterpretation.” The Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics 119(1): pp. 1–48.
Rodrik, Dani. 2006. “The Social Cost of Foreign Exchange Reserves.” International
Economic Journal 2(3): 253 – 266.
Rodrik, Dani. 2008. “The Real Exchange Rate and Economic Growth.” Brookings Pa-
pers on Economic Activity (Fall).
Steinberg, David A., and Krishan Malhotra. 2014. “The Effect of Authoritarian Regime
Type on Exchange Rate Policy.” World Politics 66(3): 491–529.
Walter, Barbara F. 2006. “Information, Uncertainty, and the Decision to Secede.” Inter-
national Organization 60(1): 105–135.
Warner, Zach. 2015. “Conditional Relationships in Dynamic Models.” Poster Presented
at PolMeth 32 .
Williams, Laron K., and Guy D. Whitten. 2012. “But Wait, There’s More! Maximizing
Substantive Inferences from TSCS Models.” The Journal of Politics 74(7): 685–693.
World Bank. 2013. World Development Indicators. Washington, DC: World Bank.
33
Insuring Against Past Perils:
The Politics of Post-Currency Crisis Foreign Exchange Reserve Accumulation
Supplementary Materials
Liam F. McGrath
The supplementary materials include descriptive statistics and additional estimations
referenced in the main text. In addition I discuss the robustness tests chosen in detail as
well as the potential issues with the sample definition.
Table 2 displays descriptive statistics for all variables used in the statistical analy-
ses.
Tables 4 - 8 display the tables of coefficients for the main results which were displayed
graphically in the text.
Tables 11 - 63 display the various robustness tests conducted for the main results of the
paper.
34
Ta
bl
e
2:
Su
m
m
ar
y
st
at
is
tic
s
V
ar
ia
bl
e
O
bs
M
ea
n
St
d.
D
ev
.
M
in
M
ax
Fo
re
ig
n
E
xc
ha
ng
e
R
es
er
ve
s
in
M
on
th
s
of
Im
po
rt
s
(W
D
I)
45
69
3.
51
8
3.
11
5
0
43
.6
92
L
og
of
R
es
er
ve
s
in
M
on
th
s
of
Im
po
rt
s
(fi
re
s
to
tl
m
o)
(W
D
I)
45
68
.9
04
.9
53
-6
.1
13
3.
77
7
L
ag
of
L
og
of
R
es
er
ve
s
in
M
on
th
s
of
Im
po
rt
s
(fi
re
s
to
tl
m
o)
(W
D
I)
45
68
.9
04
.9
53
-6
.1
13
3.
77
7
M
aj
or
C
ab
in
et
C
ha
ng
e
20
20
.5
96
.4
91
0
1
C
ha
ng
e
in
E
ff
ec
tiv
e
E
xe
cu
tiv
e
20
20
.3
03
.4
6
0
1
W
ei
gh
te
d
M
aj
or
C
ab
in
et
C
ha
ng
e
17
83
.4
34
.4
45
0
1
W
ei
gh
te
d
C
ha
ng
e
in
E
ff
ec
tiv
e
E
xe
cu
tiv
e
17
83
.2
17
.3
84
0
1
Ti
m
e
si
nc
e
la
st
cu
rr
en
cy
cr
is
is
26
85
6.
03
5
7.
09
5
0
38
Po
lit
y
2
Sc
or
e
53
73
10
.7
53
7.
46
3
0
20
IM
F
Pr
og
ra
m
(l
as
tin
g
>
5
m
on
th
)D
ur
in
g
Pr
ev
io
us
C
ri
si
s
21
59
.3
66
.4
82
0
1
Im
po
rt
s
(\%
G
D
P)
(W
D
I)
55
37
41
.1
08
23
.6
88
.1
25
21
5.
26
8
Tr
ad
e
B
al
an
ce
(E
xp
or
ts
-I
m
po
rt
s
\%
G
D
P)
(W
D
I)
55
37
-6
.4
2
16
.5
25
-1
35
.6
01
81
.5
46
C
en
tr
al
B
an
k
In
de
pe
nd
en
ce
54
46
-.4
84
.6
-2
.2
36
0
Pr
es
id
en
tia
lS
ys
te
m
(D
PI
)
62
25
.5
54
.4
97
0
1
G
D
P
pe
rc
ap
ita
(n
at
ur
al
lo
g)
(W
D
I)
58
90
7.
34
5
1.
52
6
4.
04
6
11
.4
55
G
D
P
gr
ow
th
(W
D
I)
57
89
3.
74
2
6.
44
2
-5
1.
03
1
10
6.
28
Po
pu
la
tio
n
(n
at
ur
al
lo
g)
(W
D
I)
68
16
15
.3
74
1.
99
8
10
.0
43
21
.0
05
C
ap
ita
lA
cc
ou
nt
O
pe
nn
es
s
(C
hi
nn
an
d
It
o)
55
73
-.0
55
1.
50
5
-1
.8
64
2.
43
9
C
ur
re
nc
y
Pe
g
(c
al
cu
la
te
d
fr
om
an
nu
al
co
ar
se
)
50
76
.6
56
.4
75
0
1
C
ur
re
nc
y
C
ri
si
s
(R
ei
nh
ar
ta
nd
R
og
of
f)
26
85
.2
06
.4
05
0
1
U
nd
er
va
lu
ed
E
xc
ha
ng
e
R
at
e
68
60
-.0
03
.4
84
-5
.3
91
2.
90
5
G
D
P
C
ha
ng
e
D
ur
in
g
Pr
ev
io
us
C
ri
si
s
20
16
.0
33
.1
62
-.7
38
.9
22
G
D
P
C
ha
ng
e
D
ur
in
g
Pr
ev
io
us
C
ri
si
s
20
41
.0
32
.2
13
-.7
38
1.
98
6
\#
C
ri
se
s
in
R
eg
io
n
D
ur
in
g
Pr
ev
io
us
C
ri
si
s
20
03
2.
30
6
2.
25
7
0
9
Pr
op
or
tio
n
of
re
se
rv
es
sp
en
td
ur
in
g
pr
ev
io
us
cr
is
is
(m
aj
ca
b
ch
an
ge
)
20
84
.8
91
8.
51
3
-.7
95
89
.4
1
Pr
op
or
tio
n
of
re
se
rv
es
sp
en
td
ur
in
g
pr
ev
io
us
cr
is
is
(c
ha
ng
e
in
ef
f.
ex
ec
)
20
84
.8
79
8.
51
4
-.7
95
89
.4
1
Pr
e-
C
ri
si
s
R
es
er
ve
s
18
23
.9
86
.8
48
-2
.8
29
2.
76
8
R
ea
lI
nt
er
es
tR
at
e
D
iff
er
en
tia
l:
(r
ea
l
ir
/1
00
)-
us
10
yr
38
41
-.0
76
.1
52
-1
.0
78
4.
37
3
L
og
of
To
ta
lR
es
er
ve
s
(e
xc
lu
di
ng
go
ld
)
56
89
20
.2
05
2.
52
5
9.
21
28
.0
56
L
ag
of
L
og
of
To
ta
lR
es
er
ve
s
(e
xc
lu
di
ng
go
ld
)
56
83
20
.2
07
2.
52
5
9.
21
28
.0
56
C
ha
ng
e
in
E
xc
ha
ng
e
R
at
e
(P
en
n
W
or
ld
Ta
bl
es
,U
S
D
ol
la
rN
um
er
ai
re
69
60
.8
61
33
.0
38
-.9
84
26
26
.7
65
M
aj
or
C
ab
in
et
C
ha
ng
e
(c
ri
si
s
w
in
do
w
ex
te
nd
ed
)
21
70
.8
72
.3
34
0
1
C
ha
ng
e
in
E
ff
ec
tiv
e
E
xe
cu
tiv
e
(c
ri
si
s
w
in
do
w
ex
te
nd
ed
)
20
75
.6
62
.4
73
0
1
W
ei
gh
te
d
M
aj
or
C
ab
in
et
C
ha
ng
e
(c
ri
si
s
w
in
do
w
ex
te
nd
ed
)
17
01
.6
66
.3
98
0
1
C
ha
ng
e
in
E
ff
ec
tiv
e
E
xe
cu
tiv
e
(c
ri
si
s
w
in
do
w
ex
te
nd
ed
)
16
06
.5
12
.4
49
0
1
L
en
gt
h
of
Pr
ev
io
us
C
ur
re
nc
y
C
ri
si
s
19
76
3.
68
2
2.
19
7
2
21
M
aj
or
C
ab
in
et
C
ha
ng
e
(m
ea
n
ov
er
al
lp
re
vi
ou
s
cr
is
es
)
18
90
.5
64
.3
82
0
1
C
ha
ng
e
in
E
ff
ec
tiv
e
E
xe
cu
tiv
e
(m
ea
n
ov
er
al
lp
re
vi
ou
s
cr
is
es
)
18
90
.3
12
.3
61
0
1
M
aj
or
C
ab
in
et
C
ha
ng
e
(w
ei
gh
te
d
m
ea
n
ov
er
al
lp
re
vi
ou
s
cr
is
es
)
18
90
.3
07
.3
27
0
1
C
ha
ng
e
in
E
ff
ec
tiv
e
E
xe
cu
tiv
e
(w
ei
gh
te
d
m
ea
n
ov
er
al
lp
re
vi
ou
s
cr
is
es
)
18
90
.1
63
.2
61
0
1
35
Tables for Main Results in Text
36
Table 3: The Effect of Political Change During Previous Currency Crises upon Reserve
Accumulation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unweighted Weighted Unweighted Weighted
Lag of Log Reserves 0.810∗∗∗ 0.809∗∗∗ 0.811∗∗∗ 0.808∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.040) (0.040) (0.041)
Major Cabinet Changes 0.051∗ 0.056∗∗
(0.027) (0.023)
Change in Effective Executive 0.057∗∗ 0.068∗∗
(0.026) (0.027)
Polity 2 Score 0.006∗ 0.006∗ 0.006∗∗ 0.005∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
IMF Program During Previous Crisis -0.016 -0.016 -0.023 -0.021
(0.029) (0.029) (0.032) (0.032)
Imports (% GDP) -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Trade Balance (Exports - Imports % GDP) 0.015∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Central Bank Independence 0.018 0.016 0.018 0.016
(0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014)
Presidential System 0.093 0.096 0.104 0.110∗
(0.065) (0.065) (0.065) (0.064)
GDP per capita (natural log) -0.118∗ -0.109∗ -0.116∗ -0.109∗
(0.062) (0.063) (0.062) (0.063)
GDP growth -0.007∗ -0.007∗ -0.007∗ -0.007∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Population (natural log) 0.342 0.383 0.347 0.375
(0.228) (0.230) (0.222) (0.226)
Capital Account Openness -0.015 -0.013 -0.014 -0.013
(0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013)
Currency Peg 0.032 0.029 0.030 0.031
(0.037) (0.036) (0.036) (0.035)
Currency Crisis -0.124∗∗∗ -0.128∗∗∗ -0.125∗∗∗ -0.128∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029)
Time Trend -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Constant -4.601 -5.317 -4.692 -5.181
(3.996) (4.033) (3.900) (3.964)
Observations 1479 1477 1479 1477
Country Fixed Effects X X X X
Country clustered standard errors in parentheses∗ p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01
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Table 4: Log Reserves in Months of Imports - Crises in Neighbourhood when Own
Occurs
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unweighted Weighted Unweighted Weighted
Lag of Log Reserves 0.808∗∗∗ 0.807∗∗∗ 0.810∗∗∗ 0.807∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.039) (0.039) (0.040)
Major Cabinet Change 0.023 0.041
(0.044) (0.038)
# Crises in Region During Previous Crisis -0.014 -0.010 -0.010 -0.009
(0.013) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011)
Major Cabinet Change × # Crises in Region During Previous Crisis 0.012 0.007
(0.012) (0.010)
Change in Effective Executive 0.036 0.064
(0.042) (0.044)
Change in Effective Executive × # Crises in Region During Previous Crisis 0.009 0.003
(0.011) (0.010)
Polity 2 Score 0.006∗ 0.006∗ 0.006∗∗ 0.006∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
IMF Program During Previous Crisis -0.019 -0.016 -0.027 -0.022
(0.029) (0.029) (0.032) (0.032)
Imports (% GDP) -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Trade Balance (Exports - Imports % GDP) 0.015∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Central Bank Independence 0.019 0.018 0.020 0.017
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014)
Presidential System 0.096 0.100 0.106 0.112∗
(0.066) (0.066) (0.065) (0.065)
GDP per capita (natural log) -0.121∗ -0.111∗ -0.118∗ -0.111∗
(0.062) (0.063) (0.062) (0.063)
GDP growth -0.007∗ -0.007∗ -0.007∗ -0.007∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Population (natural log) 0.319 0.369 0.322 0.359
(0.231) (0.233) (0.227) (0.231)
Capital Account Openness -0.015 -0.014 -0.015 -0.014
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Currency Peg 0.030 0.028 0.029 0.032
(0.036) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035)
Currency Crisis -0.122∗∗∗ -0.126∗∗∗ -0.124∗∗∗ -0.127∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029)
Time Trend 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Constant -4.180 -5.064 -4.254 -4.902
(4.063) (4.101) (4.002) (4.066)
Observations 1479 1477 1479 1477
Country Fixed Effects X X X X
Country clustered standard errors in parentheses∗ p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01 38
Table 5: Log Reserves in Months of Imports - Economic Severity of the Previous Cur-
rency Crisis
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unweighted Weighted Unweighted Weighted
Lag of Log Reserves 0.795∗∗∗ 0.794∗∗∗ 0.809∗∗∗ 0.806∗∗∗
(0.041) (0.041) (0.040) (0.040)
Major Cabinet Change 0.042 0.053∗∗
(0.029) (0.026)
Change in Effective Executive 0.039 0.050∗
(0.026) (0.028)
GDP Change During Previous Crisis -0.121 -0.084 -0.024 -0.048
(0.152) (0.092) (0.104) (0.088)
Major Cabinet Change × GDP Change During Previous Crisis 0.237 0.343∗∗∗
(0.155) (0.120)
Change in Effective Executive × GDP Change During Previous Crisis 0.055 0.213
(0.116) (0.156)
Polity 2 Score 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.005
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
IMF Program During Previous Crisis -0.002 -0.001 -0.020 -0.019
(0.027) (0.027) (0.033) (0.032)
Imports (% GDP) -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Trade Balance (Exports - Imports % GDP) 0.014∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Central Bank Independence 0.002 0.000 0.011 0.009
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Presidential System 0.066 0.087 0.100 0.116∗
(0.055) (0.056) (0.065) (0.064)
GDP per capita (natural log) -0.130∗ -0.130∗ -0.114∗ -0.113∗
(0.066) (0.065) (0.066) (0.066)
GDP growth -0.007 -0.007 -0.009∗∗ -0.008∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Population (natural log) 0.460∗ 0.461∗ 0.445∗ 0.451∗
(0.254) (0.249) (0.242) (0.242)
Capital Account Openness -0.017 -0.018 -0.017 -0.017
(0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013)
Currency Peg 0.051 0.052 0.032 0.037
(0.037) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036)
Currency Crisis -0.118∗∗∗ -0.127∗∗∗ -0.123∗∗∗ -0.127∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.029)
Time Trend -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002
(0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Constant -6.419 -6.450 -6.291 -6.420
(4.442) (4.350) (4.242) (4.241)
Observations 1429 1429 1453 1453
Country Fixed Effects X X X X
Country clustered standard errors in parentheses∗ p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01
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Table 6: The Effect of Political Change During Previous Currency Crises Conditional
Upon the Maximal Proportion of Reserves Spent During the Crisis and the Pre-Crisis
Level of Reserves
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unweighted Unweighted Weighted Weighted
Lag of Log of Reserves 0.808∗∗∗ 0.813∗∗∗ 0.804∗∗∗ 0.814∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034)
Major Cabinet Change 0.022 0.063
(0.066) (0.053)
Change in Effective Executive -0.042 0.024
(0.052) (0.055)
Reserves Spent During Previous Crisis 0.304∗∗∗ 0.206∗∗ 0.235∗∗∗ 0.168∗∗∗
(0.103) (0.079) (0.066) (0.058)
Pre-Crisis Reserves -0.033 -0.017 -0.021 -0.011
(0.039) (0.029) (0.033) (0.028)
Major Cabinet Change × Reserves Spent -0.233∗∗ -0.159∗∗
(0.115) (0.071)
Change in Effective Executive × Reserves Spent -0.116 -0.117
(0.084) (0.083)
Major Cabinet Change × Pre-Crisis Reserves 0.055 0.030
(0.048) (0.038)
Change in Eff. Executive × Pre-Crisis Reserves 0.075∗∗ 0.035
(0.034) (0.038)
Reserves Spent × Pre-Crisis Reserves -0.208∗∗ -0.084∗∗ -0.225∗∗∗ -0.100∗∗
(0.095) (0.042) (0.068) (0.041)
Major Cabinet Change × Reserves Spent × Pre-Crisis Reserves 0.166 0.196∗∗∗
(0.100) (0.069)
Change in Eff. Exec. × Reserves Spent × Pre-Crisis Reserves 0.012 0.090
(0.054) (0.066)
Polity 2 Score 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
IMF Program During Previous Crisis -0.033 -0.028 -0.020 -0.027
(0.026) (0.026) (0.027) (0.030)
Imports (% GDP) -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Trade Balance (Exports - Imports % GDP) 0.016∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Central Bank Independence 0.018 0.018 0.020 0.017
(0.014) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015)
Presidential System (DPI) 0.102 0.102 0.123∗ 0.113∗
(0.064) (0.066) (0.064) (0.064)
GDP per capita (natural log) -0.159∗∗ -0.157∗∗ -0.154∗∗ -0.154∗∗
(0.065) (0.069) (0.069) (0.071)
GDP growth -0.008∗∗ -0.009∗∗ -0.009∗∗ -0.009∗∗
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Population (natural log) 0.294 0.307 0.322 0.290
(0.261) (0.251) (0.260) (0.254)
Capital Account Openness -0.008 -0.009 -0.008 -0.009
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Currency Peg 0.003 0.002 0.023 0.018
(0.041) (0.041) (0.040) (0.040)
Currency Crisis -0.135∗∗∗ -0.143∗∗∗ -0.143∗∗∗ -0.143∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.032) (0.030) (0.031)
Time Trend 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.002
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Constant -3.538 -3.738 -4.086 -3.522
(4.476) (4.357) (4.478) (4.420)
Observations 1352 1352 1352 1352
Country Fixed Effects X X X X
Country clustered standard errors in parentheses∗ p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01
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Table 7: The Effect of Political Change During Previous Currency Crises upon Reserve
Accumulation Conditional Upon Interest Rate Differentials
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unweighted Weighted Unweighted Weighted
Lag Log of Reserves 0.786∗∗∗ 0.785∗∗∗ 0.786∗∗∗ 0.782∗∗∗
(0.048) (0.048) (0.049) (0.049)
Major Cabinet Change 0.013 0.020
(0.037) (0.024)
Real Interest Rate Differential -0.067 -0.005 -0.135 -0.019
(0.242) (0.057) (0.282) (0.071)
Major Cabinet Change × Real Interest Rate Differential -0.036 -0.239
(0.250) (0.161)
Change in Effective Executive 0.040 0.036
(0.034) (0.032)
Change in Effective Executive × Real Interest Rate Differential 0.036 -0.213
(0.286) (0.162)
Polity 2 Score 0.006∗ 0.005 0.006∗ 0.005
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
IMF Program During Previous Crisis -0.016 -0.010 -0.022 -0.015
(0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.032)
Imports (% GDP) -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Trade Balance (Exports - Imports % GDP) 0.013∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Central Bank Independence 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Presidential System 0.121∗ 0.115∗ 0.126∗∗ 0.125∗
(0.063) (0.065) (0.062) (0.064)
GDP per capita (natural log) -0.103 -0.100 -0.103 -0.097
(0.071) (0.072) (0.071) (0.073)
GDP growth -0.007∗ -0.008∗ -0.007∗ -0.007∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Population (natural log) 0.372 0.396 0.373 0.390
(0.263) (0.270) (0.264) (0.265)
Capital Account Openness -0.019 -0.015 -0.019 -0.017
(0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014)
Currency Peg 0.032 0.029 0.030 0.030
(0.041) (0.041) (0.040) (0.041)
Currency Crisis -0.131∗∗∗ -0.136∗∗∗ -0.131∗∗∗ -0.137∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032)
Time Trend 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007)
Constant -5.170 -5.557 -5.204 -5.486
(4.569) (4.685) (4.585) (4.611)
Observations 1248 1246 1248 1246
Country Fixed Effects X X X X
Country clustered standard errors in parentheses∗ p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01
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Table 8: Interaction Effects of Central Bank Independence and Political Change upon
Reserve Accumulation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unweighted Weighted Unweighted Weighted
Lag of Log Reserves 0.811∗∗∗ 0.809∗∗∗ 0.811∗∗∗ 0.808∗∗∗
(0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040)
Major Cabinet Change 0.042 0.038
(0.029) (0.032)
Change in Effective Executive 0.055∗ 0.062
(0.029) (0.038)
Central Bank Independence 0.027 0.027 0.020 0.018
(0.020) (0.017) (0.015) (0.015)
Major Cabinet Change × CBI -0.013 -0.023
(0.024) (0.028)
Change in Effective Exec. × CBI -0.003 -0.008
(0.025) (0.035)
Polity 2 Score 0.006∗∗ 0.006∗ 0.006∗∗ 0.005∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
IMF Program During Previous Crisis -0.014 -0.013 -0.023 -0.020
(0.029) (0.030) (0.033) (0.032)
Imports (% GDP) -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Trade Balance (Exports - Imports % GDP) 0.015∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Presidential System 0.094 0.097 0.104 0.109∗
(0.066) (0.065) (0.065) (0.064)
GDP per capita (natural log) -0.118∗ -0.107∗ -0.116∗ -0.109∗
(0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.063)
GDP growth -0.007∗ -0.007∗ -0.007∗ -0.007∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Population (natural log) 0.342 0.396∗ 0.347 0.377∗
(0.227) (0.228) (0.222) (0.225)
Capital Account Openness -0.014 -0.013 -0.014 -0.013
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Currency Peg 0.031 0.028 0.030 0.031
(0.036) (0.036) (0.035) (0.035)
Currency Crisis -0.124∗∗∗ -0.128∗∗∗ -0.125∗∗∗ -0.128∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.029) (0.030) (0.029)
Time Trend -0.000 -0.002 -0.000 -0.001
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Constant -4.598 -5.536 -4.687 -5.216
(3.981) (4.002) (3.898) (3.958)
Observations 1479 1477 1479 1477
Country Fixed Effects X X X X
Country clustered standard errors in parentheses∗ p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01
42
Sample Definition
One limitation of the sampling strategy is that it does not allow the inclusion of countries
who have not experienced a currency crisis. However the inclusion of these country
years is not without its own problems. For those country years to be included they
would have to receive values for the political change variables. Yet as political change
is unobserved when there is no currency crisis, this would necessitate choosing values
for those country years where there has yet to be a currency crisis. Whilst it may seem
intuitive to simply set these to zeros, this is problematic as countries who experienced no
political change during a currency crisis would then be considered the same as those who
have not experienced a currency crisis.21 Thus in order to ensure observations remain
comparable, countries who have not experienced a currency crisis are not included in
the sample.22 However I conduct a series of robustness tests to ensure that this sample
definition does not drive the results.
A second limitation of this approach is that the political consequences of a currency
crisis may occur after the crisis period itself. That is a government may lose political
power two years after the crisis ends, which would not have occurred if there were no
crisis. However this limitation of the sample would make the tests more conservative if
the implications of the theory were true. This is because cases where the government
lost power after the currency crisis, and subsequent governments engaged in insurance
through reserves, would be coded as not having political change. Thus there would be a
greater proportion of those classed as having no change engaging in reserve accumula-
tion, resulting in similar reserve levels when comparing those countries who are classed
21As noted in the robustness section, using this approach instead does not change the inferences of the
main results.
22Other work looking at learning from political change in other countries does not have this same
limitation (Author, 2014).
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as experiencing political change to those who didn’t. Therefore whilst it would be pre-
ferred to correctly classify these cases, this approach minimises incorrect classifications
in the other direction (i.e. countries where political turnover after currency crises was
not the result of the crisis itself), whilst also providing a more conservative test of the
implications of the theory.
Table 9 illustrates this for two hypothetical countries, one that experiences just one
currency crisis and the other that experiences two currency crises.
Table 9: An Example Sample
Country Year Crisis Pol. ∆ ∆Polcrisis In Sample?
1 1970 0 1 . F
1 1971 1 2 . F
1 1972 1 0 . F
1 1973 0 1 1 T
1 1974 0 0 1 T
2 1970 0 0 . F
2 1971 1 2 . F
2 1972 0 1 1 T
2 1973 1 0 1 T
2 1974 0 0 0 T
Robustness Tests
First, I examine the extent to which the effect of political change during currency crises
changes as the past currency crisis becomes further in the past. This is important as we
could expect the political lessons of a crisis that occurred twenty years ago to be far less
informative to a government than one that occurred two years ago. To account for this
I include an interaction effect between the political change variables and the amount of
years since the last currency crisis.23 In doing so the effect of political change during
23Table 11 in the appendix.
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previous currency crises changes as the time since the crisis ended increases.24 Over
time the effect of political change becomes weaker, and is no longer statistically signif-
icant after approximately seven years. However this interaction itself is not statistically
significant due to the confidence intervals at all time periods overlapping. Thus the
results of the main statistical analysis are robust to accounting for the time since the
currency crisis occurred.
Second, the main estimation focuses on governments’ only learning from the most re-
cent currency crisis. However it is plausible that governments’ base their decisions on
the whole history of political outcomes of currency crises. Therefore I construct vari-
ables which are cumulative means of the political change variables over the entire time
frame of the sample.25 The inferences of the main results remain the same.26 The only
models that are not robust are those that condition the effect of political change upon
the real interest rate differential. In this case the coefficients on the constitutive term of
the real interest rate differential change sign.
Third, another potential non-political mechanism for the results observed may be related
to undervalued exchange rates. It is possible that after currency crises governments’
seek to improve their country’s export performance by using an undervalued exchange
rate. In this way they would be able to reduce their likelihood of currency crises as well
as increase reserve levels, in a way that is not driven by the political reasoning outlined
in this paper. Whilst this is to some extent already accounted for with the inclusion of
a country’s trade balance in the main models, as a robustness check I include a variable
24Figure 11 in the appendix
25These are weighted means in the case of the variables weighted by political similarity, following the
same approach as before. Models that rely on other information from the currency crisis, e.g. reserves
spent, are not estimated for this robustness test.
26Tables 12 - 14 in the appendix.
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measuring the degree to which a country’s exchange rate is undervalued. This variable
is constructed using the methodology suggested by Rodrik (2008), using data from the
Penn World Tables (Heston, Summers, and Aten, 2012). In doing so the results remain
robust in terms of the sign of the coefficients.27 However this is not the case for the
models for the real interest rate differential. In this case the sign of the coefficient
for the constitutive term of the real interest rate differential changes in the estimations
including the weighted political change variables, and the unweighted executive change
variable also changes sign.
Fourth, I examine the robustness of the results to the use of an alternative dependent
variable. For the main results I use a dependent variable which is the ratio of reserves
to months of imports, due to the effectiveness of reserves being tied to the amount of
imports they are able to cover. However as it is a ratio, it is possible for this variable
to increase due to declines in imports whilst reserve levels remain unchanged. This can
be problematic as currency crises are often associated with shocks to trade. Therefore
I perform a robustness test using the natural logarithm of the value of reserves (exclud-
ing gold) in current US Dollars from the World Development Indicators (World Bank,
2013) as the dependent variable.28 The effects of variables remain in the expected di-
rection. However for two classes of model the results are not robust. First, in the models
looking at the efficacy of reserve sales during the previous crisis the marginal effects for
unweighted change in executive is in the opposite direction to the main results. Further-
more whilst the weighted change in executive marginal effect remains in the expected
direction, it is substantively very weak. Second are the models for the real interest rate
27Tables 15 - 20 in the appendix. Note that these estimations exclude the United States as exchange
rates are relative to the US Dollar.
28Tables 21 - 26 in the appendix.
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differential. In this case the sign of the coefficient for the constitutive term of the real in-
terest rate differential changes in the estimations including the weighted political change
variables, and the unweighted political change variables also changes sign.
Fifth, I examine possible unit heterogeneity in the form of countries within different re-
gions typically implementing different reserve policies. Edison (2003) notes how coun-
tries in South-East Asia following the 1997 crisis have typically held high levels of
reserves. South America also had a famous financial crisis in the 1980s as well, which
may also have subsequently affected governments reserve accumulation policies. To
assess the sensitivity of the results to these concerns, I include region fixed effects into
the estimation. Country fixed effects are removed in this estimation, as regional fixed
effects are a linear combination of country fixed effects. In this case there are problems
with robustness for four out of the six hypotheses.29 For the effect of political change
conditional upon the number of other currency crises occurring at the same time as the
previous currency crisis, the multiplicative term for the weighted change in effective
executive model changes sign. For the effect of political change conditional upon the
severity of the previous crisis, the constitutive term for change in GDP and the multi-
plicative term change sign for the unweighted versions of the political change variable.
For the models regarding the efficacy of previous reserves sales, the marginal effect is in
the opposite direction for the unweighted major cabinet change and effective executive
variables, and is flat for the weighted change in effective executive variable. Finally for
the models regarding the conditional effect of central bank independence, the constitu-
tive term for central bank independence changes sign in the unweighted models.
Sixth, as the statistical analysis focuses on governments learning from previous cur-
29Tables 27 - 32 in the appendix
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rency crises occurring within their country there may be issues of sample selection. I
attempt to account for this issue in two distinct ways. First, I run Heckman selection
models.30 The selection stage comprises of an outcome variable, which is whether for a
given country year there has ever been a currency crisis. As predictors of this I include
the natural logarithm of GDP per capita, GDP growth, capital account openness, the
trade balance, whether a country has a currency peg or not and a cubic polynomial of
time. The results remain robust to this operationalisation, apart from two of the models
regarding the real interest rate differential. In those models the constitutive term for the
real interest rate differential changes sign when using the unweighted political change
variables. Second, I replace missing values generated by the crisis sampling in order
to run a comparable analysis on the full sample. For the unweighted political change
variables, I set the missing values to 0.5 which is the point between experiencing (1) and
not experiencing political change (0).31. I then conduct another robustness test but this
time set all the missing values for political change to zero.32 Missing values for whether
a country is experiencing a currency and whether the IMF was involved in the previous
currency crisis are also set to zero in all models. For these imputation models I do not
replicate the estimations related to hypotheses 2 - 4, as they rely upon features of the
previous currency crisis. In doing so the results remain robust for the unconditional ef-
fect of political change. The results are not robust for the effect conditional upon the real
interest rate differential, where the constitutive term for the real interest rate differential
changes sign in all models. In addition the results for central bank independence are
30Tables 33 - 38 in the appendix.
31Tables 39 - 41 in the appendix. This approach is not done for the political change variables weighted
by political similarity, as any positive value would have the interpretation of a political change occurring
previously in a non-identical political system.
32Tables 42 - 44 in the appendix. This approach is calculated for both unweighted and weighted
political change variables.
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not robust to setting missing values to zero, as the multiplicative term of the interaction
changes sign.
Seventh, I use a variable measuring annual changes in a country’s exchange rate as a
control variable instead of whether a country is currently experiencing a currency crisis.
This allows for greater variation in a country’s economic situation, and weakens the cut-
off based definition used by Reinhart and Rogoff (2009).33 All models apart from those
focused on the real interest rate differential are robust to this robustness test. In that case
the multiplicative term for the interaction effect changes sign for the unweighted change
in effective executive.
Eigth, I assess whether the effect of political change is sensitive to extending the win-
dow defining whether the previous currency crisis resulted in political change. As noted
in the data section, by looking at political change during the time period where the cur-
rency crisis was ongoing this misses cases where political change occurred after the
crisis that would not have occurred if the crisis did not happen. Therefore I allow po-
litical change that occurred in a two year period after the previous currency crisis to
be coded as a political change occurring as a result of the crisis.34 In doing so the di-
rection of the effect of political change remains positive, however its substantive size
decreases and is no longer statistically significant at conventional levels. However this
is likely due to increasing false positives on the political change variable. By extend-
ing the window outside of the crisis period, the variable now also includes cases where
there was political change in this period but not related to the currency crisis. Thus we
attribute learning to these cases, even though governments would learn that the crisis
was not politically costly and thus not accumulate reserves. Therefore these false pos-
33Tables 45 - 50 in the appendix.
34Table 51 in the appendix.
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itives should move the coefficient towards zero or even negative. Even so the fact that
the association remains in the same direction does not completely invalidate the results
of the paper.
The ninth robustness test deals with the issue of variation in the lengths of currency
crises. Whilst the majority of currency crises last five years or less, some go on for
longer periods of time. To ensure that the length of the currency crises isn’t confound-
ing the association between political change and reserve accumulation, I conduct two
robustness tests. First I estimate the models on a subsample of countries, excluding
cases where the previous currency crisis lasted longer than 5 years.35 Second I include
the length of the previous currency crisis in the model to control for this factor.36 For
both cases the direction of the unconditional effect is robust, and is always statistically
significant at conventional levels for the effect of political change when weighted by
political similarity. In contrast for the unweighted variable the effect is close to conven-
tional levels of statistical significance when measured as change in effective executive,
yet is not the case for major cabinet changes. All other models are robust in the direc-
tion of the coefficients, apart from those related to the real interest rate differential and
central bank independence. In the case of the real interest rate differential, there are a
number of sign changes in the coefficients for both controlling and subsampling to deal
with the length of the previous crisis. In the case of central bank independence, the mul-
tiplicative interaction term changes sign for unweighted change in effective executive
when controlling for the length of the crisis. For subsampling to deal with the length of
the previous currency crisis all multiplicative interaction terms change sign, other than
those related to the weighted major cabinet changes variable.
35Tables 52 - 57 in the appendix.
36Tables 58 - 63 in the appendix.
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The tenth and final robustness test is the use of an Error Correction Model specifica-
tion, the results of which are displayed in table 64.37 The Error Correction Model finds
a statistically significant effect for the difference (contemporaneous effect) in political
change, and an effect in the expected (positive) direction for the lagged value (com-
pounding effect) however this is not statistically significant at conventional levels for 3
of the 4 models.
Table 10: Definition of Regions
Region Correlates of War Codes
North and Middle America 2 - 99
South America 100 - 199
West and Central Europe 200 - 325
East and Southern Europe 338 - 373
Central Africa 400 - 499
Southern Africa 500 - 599
Northern Africa 600 - 699
Asia 700 - 850
Australasia 851 - 990
37This is only estimated for the models where there are no interaction terms. Current research suggests
that there are potential problems with the use of interaction terms in dynamic models including the Error
Correction Model (Warner, 2015). However as the research behind this problem is work in progress it is
not clear how the effectively deal with the problem, and so these models are omitted.
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Currency Crises: 1970 − 2007
Figure 7: Crisis episodes for all countries included in the sample, data from Reinhart
and Rogoff (2009)
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Figure 8: Histograms displaying that the variable measuring reserves in months of im-
ports has a heavy positive skew. Transformation using the natural logarithm results in a
variable that is closer to being distributed normally.
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Figure 9: Histograms for the variables measuring political change during previous cur-
rency crises.
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Figure 10: The long-run effect of political change during past currency crises upon
reserve accumulation. Points indicate predicted values of the level of reserves, lines in-
dicate 95% confidence intervals. Black indicates the scenario where there was political
change during the previous crisis, grey where there was no such political change.
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Figure 11: The effect of political change during previous currency crises, conditional
upon time since the last crisis. The larger dashed lines indicate 95% confidence inter-
vals, and the dashed density shows the distribution of the amount of time since the last
currency crisis in the sample.
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Table 11: Interaction Effects of Time Since Last Currency Crisis and Political Change
upon Reserve Accumulation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unweighted Weighted Unweighted Weighted
Lag of Log Reserves 0.810∗∗∗ 0.809∗∗∗ 0.810∗∗∗ 0.807∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.040)
Major Cabinet Change 0.055∗ 0.064∗∗
(0.031) (0.029)
Change in Effective Executive 0.065∗∗ 0.078∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.029)
Time Since Last Currency Crisis 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Major Cab. Changes × Time -0.001 -0.003
(0.004) (0.005)
Change in Eff. Exec × Time -0.003 -0.004
(0.004) (0.005)
Polity 2 Score 0.006∗ 0.005∗ 0.006∗∗ 0.005∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
IMF Program During Previous Crisis -0.016 -0.017 -0.021 -0.021
(0.029) (0.030) (0.032) (0.032)
Imports (% GDP) -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Trade Balance (Exports - Imports % GDP) 0.015∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Central Bank Independence 0.018 0.016 0.019 0.016
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Presidential System 0.093 0.095 0.104 0.108∗
(0.065) (0.064) (0.065) (0.063)
GDP per capita (natural log) -0.119∗ -0.112∗ -0.116∗ -0.110
(0.065) (0.066) (0.065) (0.066)
GDP growth -0.007∗ -0.007∗ -0.007∗ -0.007∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Population (natural log) 0.337 0.374∗ 0.352 0.375∗
(0.224) (0.224) (0.217) (0.221)
Capital Account Openness -0.015 -0.014 -0.014 -0.013
(0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013)
Currency Peg 0.032 0.029 0.031 0.032
(0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036)
Currency Crisis -0.124∗∗∗ -0.129∗∗∗ -0.127∗∗∗ -0.129∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.030) (0.031) (0.030)
Time Trend -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Constant -4.518 -5.162 -4.773 -5.180
(3.920) (3.934) (3.822) (3.892)
Observations 1479 1477 1479 1477
Country Fixed Effects X X X X
Country clustered standard errors in parentheses∗ p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01 55
Table 12: The Effect of Average Political Change Over All Previous Currency Crises
upon Reserve Accumulation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unweighted Weighted Unweighted Weighted
Lag of Log Reserves 0.811∗∗∗ 0.812∗∗∗ 0.811∗∗∗ 0.808∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.040)
Major Cabinet Changes 0.105 0.115∗∗
(0.072) (0.051)
Change in Effective Executive 0.111∗ 0.134∗∗
(0.062) (0.066)
Polity 2 Score 0.006∗∗ 0.006∗∗ 0.006∗∗ 0.006∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
IMF Program During Previous Crisis -0.010 -0.006 -0.021 -0.015
(0.029) (0.030) (0.032) (0.032)
Imports (% GDP) -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Trade Balance (Exports - Imports % GDP) 0.015∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Central Bank Independence 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.018
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Presidential System 0.095 0.092 0.099 0.102
(0.064) (0.061) (0.063) (0.061)
GDP per capita (natural log) -0.106∗ -0.103∗ -0.105∗ -0.102∗
(0.060) (0.060) (0.060) (0.060)
GDP growth -0.007∗ -0.008∗ -0.007∗ -0.007∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Population (natural log) 0.375 0.423∗ 0.388∗ 0.409∗
(0.228) (0.222) (0.220) (0.219)
Capital Account Openness -0.013 -0.013 -0.013 -0.014
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Currency Peg 0.028 0.027 0.028 0.033
(0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035)
Currency Crisis -0.123∗∗∗ -0.125∗∗∗ -0.124∗∗∗ -0.124∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029)
Time Trend -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Constant -5.251 -6.043 -5.429 -5.798
(3.974) (3.885) (3.851) (3.847)
Observations 1497 1497 1497 1497
Country Fixed Effects X X X X
Country clustered standard errors in parentheses∗ p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01
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Table 13: The Effect of Average Political Change Over All Previous Currency Crises
upon Reserve Accumulation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unweighted Weighted Unweighted Weighted
Lag of Log Reserves 0.786∗∗∗ 0.784∗∗∗ 0.783∗∗∗ 0.780∗∗∗
(0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.048)
Major Cabinet Change 0.009 0.033
(0.091) (0.061)
Change in Effective Executive 0.069 0.002
(0.074) (0.078)
Real Interest Rate Differential 0.040 -0.060 0.029 -0.023
(0.119) (0.041) (0.138) (0.043)
Major Cabinet Change × IR Differential -0.179 -0.428
(0.145) (0.342)
Change in Effective Executive × IR Differential -0.171 -0.992∗∗
(0.166) (0.394)
Polity 2 Score 0.006 0.007∗ 0.006∗ 0.006∗
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
IMF Program During Previous Crisis -0.012 -0.010 -0.018 -0.008
(0.030) (0.030) (0.031) (0.031)
Imports (% GDP) -0.003 -0.004∗ -0.003∗ -0.004∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Trade Balance (Exports - Imports % GDP) 0.013∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Central Bank Independence 0.003 0.003 0.005 0.007
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Presidential System 0.118∗ 0.108∗ 0.121∗ 0.102
(0.063) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061)
GDP per capita (natural log) -0.097 -0.093 -0.092 -0.081
(0.069) (0.068) (0.068) (0.068)
GDP growth -0.008∗ -0.007∗ -0.007∗ -0.007∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Population (natural log) 0.390 0.410 0.393 0.403
(0.264) (0.263) (0.257) (0.257)
Capital Account Openness -0.018 -0.016 -0.019 -0.019
(0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014)
Currency Peg 0.028 0.031 0.029 0.038
(0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.041)
Currency Crisis -0.132∗∗∗ -0.132∗∗∗ -0.131∗∗∗ -0.133∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.032) (0.031) (0.032)
Time Trend -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Constant -5.482 -5.877 -5.575 -5.829
(4.550) (4.547) (4.465) (4.465)
Observations 1259 1259 1259 1259
Country Fixed Effects X X X X
Country clustered standard errors in parentheses∗ p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01
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Table 14: The Effect of Average Political Change Over All Previous Currency Crises
upon Reserve Accumulation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unweighted Weighted Unweighted Weighted
Lag of Log Reserves 0.812∗∗∗ 0.810∗∗∗ 0.811∗∗∗ 0.808∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.040)
Major Cabinet Change 0.065 0.033
(0.071) (0.066)
Change in Effective Executive 0.092 0.085
(0.063) (0.084)
Central Bank Independence 0.053∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗ 0.027 0.028
(0.024) (0.018) (0.019) (0.017)
Major Cabinet Change × CBI -0.056 -0.098∗
(0.037) (0.049)
Change in Effective Executive × CBI -0.021 -0.048
(0.039) (0.064)
Polity 2 Score 0.006∗∗ 0.006∗∗ 0.006∗∗ 0.006∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
IMF Program During Previous Crisis -0.007 -0.002 -0.019 -0.013
(0.029) (0.031) (0.031) (0.032)
Imports (% GDP) -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Trade Balance (Exports - Imports % GDP) 0.015∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Presidential System 0.096 0.094 0.098 0.100
(0.064) (0.062) (0.064) (0.062)
GDP per capita (natural log) -0.103∗ -0.095 -0.105∗ -0.101∗
(0.060) (0.060) (0.060) (0.060)
GDP growth -0.008∗ -0.008∗∗ -0.007∗ -0.007∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Population (natural log) 0.385∗ 0.453∗∗ 0.392∗ 0.418∗
(0.223) (0.214) (0.220) (0.219)
Capital Account Openness -0.013 -0.014 -0.013 -0.013
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Currency Peg 0.026 0.028 0.028 0.033
(0.035) (0.034) (0.035) (0.035)
Currency Crisis -0.123∗∗∗ -0.123∗∗∗ -0.124∗∗∗ -0.124∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029)
Time Trend -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Constant -5.406 -6.561∗ -5.488 -5.949
(3.897) (3.754) (3.857) (3.844)
Observations 1497 1497 1497 1497
Country Fixed Effects X X X X
Country clustered standard errors in parentheses∗ p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01
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Table 15: The Effect of Political Change During Previous Currency Crises upon Reserve
Accumulation Controlling for Whether the Current Exchange Rate Is Undervalued
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unweighted Weighted Unweighted Weighted
Lag of Log Reserves 0.809∗∗∗ 0.808∗∗∗ 0.810∗∗∗ 0.806∗∗∗
(0.040) (0.041) (0.041) (0.042)
Major Cabinet Change 0.050∗ 0.057∗∗
(0.028) (0.023)
Change in Effective Executive 0.058∗∗ 0.070∗∗
(0.026) (0.028)
Undervalued Exchange Rate -0.028 -0.041 -0.035 -0.045
(0.052) (0.052) (0.055) (0.055)
Polity 2 Score 0.006∗ 0.005∗ 0.005∗ 0.005
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
IMF Program During Previous Crisis -0.015 -0.013 -0.021 -0.018
(0.030) (0.030) (0.032) (0.032)
Imports (% GDP) -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Trade Balance (Exports - Imports % GDP) 0.015∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Central Bank Independence 0.019 0.017 0.019 0.016
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Presidential System 0.094 0.097 0.105 0.111∗
(0.066) (0.067) (0.066) (0.066)
GDP per capita (natural log) -0.130∗∗ -0.126∗ -0.130∗ -0.127∗
(0.065) (0.066) (0.066) (0.067)
GDP growth -0.007∗ -0.007∗ -0.007∗ -0.007∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Population (natural log) 0.354 0.403∗ 0.362 0.396∗
(0.232) (0.233) (0.226) (0.228)
Capital Account Openness -0.017 -0.016 -0.017 -0.016
(0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013)
Currency Peg 0.033 0.029 0.031 0.032
(0.037) (0.037) (0.036) (0.036)
Currency Crisis -0.124∗∗∗ -0.128∗∗∗ -0.125∗∗∗ -0.128∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030)
Time Trend 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Constant -4.709 -5.523 -4.837 -5.401
(4.026) (4.043) (3.922) (3.975)
Observations 1447 1445 1447 1445
Country Fixed Effects X X X X
Standard errors in parentheses∗ p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01
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Table 16: The Effect of Political Change During Previous Currency Crises upon Reserve
Accumulation Controlling for Whether the Current Exchange Rate Is Undervalued
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unweighted Weighted Unweighted Weighted
Lag of Log Reserves 0.809∗∗∗ 0.808∗∗∗ 0.811∗∗∗ 0.807∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.039) (0.039) (0.040)
Major Cabinet Changes 0.021 0.041
(0.043) (0.038)
Change in Effective Executive 0.036 0.065
(0.042) (0.045)
# Currency Crises in Region During Prev. Crisis -0.014 -0.010 -0.010 -0.009
(0.014) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011)
Major Cabinet Changes × # Crises in Region 0.013 0.007
(0.012) (0.010)
Change in Effective Executive × # Crises in Region 0.009 0.003
(0.011) (0.010)
Undervalued Exchange Rate -0.029 -0.039 -0.033 -0.043
(0.054) (0.053) (0.056) (0.056)
Polity 2 Score 0.005∗ 0.005∗ 0.006∗∗ 0.005∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
IMF Program During Previous Crisis -0.016 -0.013 -0.025 -0.019
(0.030) (0.030) (0.032) (0.032)
Imports (% GDP) -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Trade Balance (Exports - Imports % GDP) 0.015∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Central Bank Independence 0.018 0.017 0.019 0.016
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Presidential System 0.097 0.101 0.107 0.114∗
(0.067) (0.067) (0.067) (0.066)
GDP per capita (natural log) -0.132∗∗ -0.126∗ -0.131∗ -0.127∗
(0.065) (0.066) (0.065) (0.066)
GDP growth -0.007∗ -0.007∗ -0.007∗ -0.007∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Population (natural log) 0.338 0.394 0.343 0.387
(0.235) (0.236) (0.231) (0.234)
Capital Account Openness -0.016 -0.014 -0.016 -0.015
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Currency Peg 0.029 0.027 0.028 0.031
(0.036) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035)
Currency Crisis -0.122∗∗∗ -0.126∗∗∗ -0.123∗∗∗ -0.127∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029)
Time Trend 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Constant -4.416 -5.382 -4.523 -5.254
(4.099) (4.120) (4.039) (4.084)
Observations 1479 1477 1479 1477
Country Fixed Effects X X X X
Country clustered standard errors in parentheses∗ p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01
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Table 17: The Effect of Political Change During Previous Currency Crises upon Reserve
Accumulation Controlling for Whether the Current Exchange Rate Is Undervalued
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unweighted Weighted Unweighted Weighted
Lag of Log Reserves 0.796∗∗∗ 0.794∗∗∗ 0.809∗∗∗ 0.806∗∗∗
(0.041) (0.041) (0.040) (0.040)
Major Cabinet Change 0.040 0.053∗∗
(0.029) (0.026)
GDP Change During Previous Crisis -0.126 -0.091 -0.029 -0.052
(0.152) (0.089) (0.105) (0.088)
Major Cabinet Changes × GDP Change During Prev. Crisis 0.236 0.344∗∗∗
(0.156) (0.116)
Change in Effective Executive 0.038 0.051∗
(0.026) (0.028)
Change in Effective Executive × GDP Change During Prev. Crisis 0.057 0.212
(0.117) (0.156)
Undervalued Exchange Rate -0.046 -0.055 -0.040 -0.045
(0.051) (0.052) (0.056) (0.056)
Polity 2 Score 0.004 0.003 0.005 0.004
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
IMF Program During Previous Crisis 0.002 0.004 -0.017 -0.016
(0.028) (0.027) (0.033) (0.032)
Imports (% GDP) -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Trade Balance (Exports - Imports % GDP) 0.015∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Central Bank Independence 0.000 -0.002 0.010 0.008
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Presidential System 0.066 0.087 0.101 0.117∗
(0.056) (0.057) (0.066) (0.065)
GDP per capita (natural log) -0.148∗∗ -0.151∗∗ -0.129∗ -0.129∗
(0.069) (0.069) (0.070) (0.070)
GDP growth -0.007 -0.007 -0.008∗ -0.008∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Population (natural log) 0.496∗ 0.502∗∗ 0.473∗ 0.482∗
(0.255) (0.248) (0.242) (0.242)
Capital Account Openness -0.018 -0.019 -0.018 -0.018
(0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013)
Currency Peg 0.050 0.051 0.031 0.036
(0.037) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036)
Currency Crisis -0.118∗∗∗ -0.126∗∗∗ -0.122∗∗∗ -0.126∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030)
Time Trend -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002
(0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Constant -6.885 -6.979 -6.658 -6.819
(4.435) (4.333) (4.241) (4.227)
Observations 1429 1429 1453 1453
Country Fixed Effects X X X X
Country clustered standard errors in parentheses∗ p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01
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Table 18: The Effect of Political Change During Previous Currency Crises upon Reserve
Accumulation Controlling for Whether the Current Exchange Rate Is Undervalued
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unweighted Unweighted Weighted Weighted
Lag of Log Reserves 0.809∗∗∗ 0.813∗∗∗ 0.805∗∗∗ 0.814∗∗∗
(0.033) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035)
Major Cabinet Change 0.022 0.064
(0.067) (0.054)
Change in Effective Executive -0.043 0.026
(0.052) (0.057)
Reserves Spent During Previous Crisis 0.305∗∗∗ 0.207∗∗ 0.234∗∗∗ 0.168∗∗∗
(0.105) (0.081) (0.067) (0.059)
Pre-Crisis Reserves -0.033 -0.017 -0.022 -0.011
(0.040) (0.030) (0.033) (0.029)
Major Cabinet Change × Reserves Spent -0.233∗ -0.157∗∗
(0.117) (0.073)
Change in Eff. Exec. × Reserves Spent -0.116 -0.116
(0.085) (0.086)
Major Cabinet Change × Pre-Crisis Reserves 0.056 0.030
(0.049) (0.039)
Change in Eff. Exec. × Pre-Crisis Reserves 0.075∗∗ 0.034
(0.034) (0.040)
Reserves Spent × Pre-Crisis Reserves -0.209∗∗ -0.084∗ -0.225∗∗∗ -0.101∗∗
(0.097) (0.042) (0.070) (0.042)
Major Cabinet Change × Reserves Spent × Pre-Crisis Reserves 0.167 0.194∗∗∗
(0.102) (0.071)
Change in Eff. Exec. × Reserves Spent × Pre-Crisis Reserves 0.010 0.089
(0.056) (0.069)
Undervalued Exchange Rate -0.030 -0.036 -0.030 -0.027
(0.061) (0.069) (0.062) (0.068)
Polity 2 Score 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
IMF Program During Previous Crisis -0.033 -0.027 -0.020 -0.027
(0.027) (0.028) (0.028) (0.031)
Imports (% GDP) -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Trade Balance (Exports - Imports % GDP) 0.016∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
Central Bank Independence 0.018 0.018 0.020 0.016
(0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015)
Presidential System 0.102 0.102 0.124∗ 0.114∗
(0.066) (0.069) (0.067) (0.066)
GDP per capita (natural log) -0.171∗∗ -0.172∗∗ -0.167∗∗ -0.165∗∗
(0.074) (0.081) (0.078) (0.082)
GDP growth -0.008∗∗ -0.009∗∗ -0.008∗∗ -0.009∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Population (natural log) 0.314 0.332 0.340 0.308
(0.266) (0.259) (0.267) (0.261)
Capital Account Openness -0.008 -0.009 -0.008 -0.010
(0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Currency Peg 0.002 0.001 0.022 0.018
(0.041) (0.042) (0.041) (0.041)
Currency Crisis -0.134∗∗∗ -0.141∗∗∗ -0.142∗∗∗ -0.141∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.033) (0.031) (0.032)
Time Trend 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.002
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Constant -4.517 -4.762 -5.106 -4.393
(5.289) (5.179) (5.307) (5.248)
Observations 1352 1352 1352 1352
Country Fixed Effects X X X X
Country clustered standard errors in parentheses∗ p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01 62
Table 19: The Effect of Political Change During Previous Currency Crises upon Reserve
Accumulation Controlling for Whether the Current Exchange Rate Is Undervalued
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unweighted Weighted Unweighted Weighted
Lag of Log Reserves 0.786∗∗∗ 0.786∗∗∗ 0.786∗∗∗ 0.782∗∗∗
(0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.049)
Major Cabinet Change 0.014 0.021
(0.037) (0.024)
Change in Effective Executive 0.041 0.037
(0.034) (0.033)
Real Interest Rate Differential -0.072 -0.005 -0.138 -0.019
(0.237) (0.058) (0.275) (0.071)
Major Cabinet Change × IR Differential -0.029 -0.236
(0.247) (0.164)
Change in Effective Executive × IR Differential 0.041 -0.209
(0.278) (0.160)
Undervalued Exchange Rate -0.011 -0.015 -0.014 -0.016
(0.062) (0.062) (0.060) (0.064)
Polity 2 Score 0.006∗ 0.005 0.006∗ 0.005
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
IMF Program During Previous Crisis -0.016 -0.009 -0.022 -0.014
(0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.032)
Imports (% GDP) -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Trade Balance (Exports - Imports % GDP) 0.013∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Central Bank Independence 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Presidential System 0.122∗ 0.115∗ 0.126∗∗ 0.126∗
(0.063) (0.065) (0.063) (0.065)
GDP per capita (natural log) -0.108 -0.107 -0.109 -0.103
(0.077) (0.077) (0.077) (0.079)
GDP growth -0.007 -0.007∗ -0.007 -0.007
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Population (natural log) 0.379 0.405 0.382 0.400
(0.267) (0.274) (0.267) (0.269)
Capital Account Openness -0.019 -0.015 -0.019 -0.017
(0.014) (0.015) (0.016) (0.014)
Currency Peg 0.032 0.028 0.029 0.029
(0.040) (0.041) (0.040) (0.041)
Currency Crisis -0.131∗∗∗ -0.136∗∗∗ -0.130∗∗∗ -0.136∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032)
Time Trend 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007)
Constant -5.255 -5.670 -5.310 -5.604
(4.602) (4.714) (4.602) (4.644)
Observations 1248 1246 1248 1246
Country Fixed Effects X X X X
Country clustered standard errors in parentheses∗ p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01
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Table 20: The Effect of Political Change During Previous Currency Crises upon Reserve
Accumulation Controlling for Whether the Current Exchange Rate Is Undervalued
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unweighted Weighted Unweighted Weighted
Lag of Log Reserves 0.811∗∗∗ 0.809∗∗∗ 0.812∗∗∗ 0.808∗∗∗
(0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040)
Major Cabinet Change 0.042 0.039
(0.028) (0.032)
Central Bank Independence 0.026 0.026 0.018 0.017
(0.020) (0.017) (0.015) (0.015)
Major Cabinet Change × CBI -0.012 -0.022
(0.025) (0.028)
Change in Effective Executive 0.055∗ 0.064
(0.029) (0.039)
Change in Effective Executive × CBI -0.002 -0.007
(0.026) (0.035)
Undervalued Exchange Rate -0.026 -0.038 -0.034 -0.044
(0.053) (0.052) (0.056) (0.055)
Polity 2 Score 0.006∗ 0.005∗ 0.006∗ 0.005∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
IMF Program During Previous Crisis -0.012 -0.010 -0.020 -0.017
(0.030) (0.031) (0.033) (0.032)
Imports (% GDP) -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Trade Balance (Exports - Imports % GDP) 0.015∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Presidential System 0.094 0.098 0.105 0.111∗
(0.066) (0.066) (0.066) (0.066)
GDP per capita (natural log) -0.128∗∗ -0.122∗ -0.130∗ -0.126∗
(0.064) (0.065) (0.066) (0.066)
GDP growth -0.007∗ -0.007∗ -0.007∗ -0.007∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Population (natural log) 0.359 0.420∗ 0.369 0.405∗
(0.231) (0.231) (0.225) (0.227)
Capital Account Openness -0.015 -0.014 -0.015 -0.014
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Currency Peg 0.030 0.027 0.029 0.030
(0.036) (0.036) (0.035) (0.035)
Currency Crisis -0.124∗∗∗ -0.127∗∗∗ -0.125∗∗∗ -0.127∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.029) (0.030) (0.029)
Time Trend -0.001 -0.002 -0.000 -0.001
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Constant -4.812 -5.833 -4.963 -5.564
(4.019) (4.018) (3.917) (3.962)
Observations 1479 1477 1479 1477
Country Fixed Effects X X X X
Country clustered standard errors in parentheses∗ p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01
64
Table 21: The Effect of Political Change During Previous Currency Crises upon Reserve
Accumulation - Using the Total Value of Reserves
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unweighted Weighted Unweighted Weighted
Lag of Log Reserves 0.811∗∗∗ 0.812∗∗∗ 0.812∗∗∗ 0.811∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036)
Major Cabinet Change 0.081∗∗ 0.068∗∗
(0.035) (0.030)
Change in Effective Executive 0.073∗∗ 0.068∗∗
(0.032) (0.032)
Polity 2 Score 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
IMF Program During Previous Crisis -0.005 -0.004 -0.014 -0.009
(0.041) (0.041) (0.045) (0.044)
Imports (% GDP) 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Trade Balance (Exports - Imports % GDP) 0.017∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Central Bank Independence 0.014 0.012 0.014 0.011
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
Presidential System 0.011 0.015 0.024 0.026
(0.056) (0.059) (0.056) (0.059)
GDP per capita (natural log) 0.071 0.079 0.076 0.082
(0.086) (0.086) (0.086) (0.086)
GDP growth 0.011∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Population (natural log) 0.595∗∗ 0.634∗∗∗ 0.605∗∗∗ 0.631∗∗∗
(0.228) (0.229) (0.223) (0.227)
Capital Account Openness -0.022 -0.020 -0.021 -0.020
(0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014)
Currency Peg 0.029 0.026 0.024 0.028
(0.036) (0.035) (0.036) (0.035)
Currency Crisis -0.166∗∗∗ -0.171∗∗∗ -0.168∗∗∗ -0.170∗∗∗
(0.033) (0.033) (0.034) (0.034)
Time Trend 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Constant -6.602∗ -7.266∗ -6.788∗ -7.226∗
(3.807) (3.827) (3.728) (3.805)
Observations 1547 1545 1547 1545
Country Fixed Effects X X X X
Country clustered standard errors in parentheses∗ p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01
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Table 22: The Effect of Political Change During Previous Currency Crises upon Reserve
Accumulation - Using the Total Value of Reserves
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unweighted Weighted Unweighted Weighted
Lag of Log Reserves 0.809∗∗∗ 0.809∗∗∗ 0.809∗∗∗ 0.809∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036)
Major Cabinet Change 0.053 0.054
(0.059) (0.049)
# Currency Crises in Region During Prev. Crisis -0.018 -0.015 -0.018 -0.016
(0.015) (0.013) (0.012) (0.011)
Major Cabinet Changes × # Crises in Region 0.013 0.007
(0.016) (0.013)
Change in Effective Executive 0.034 0.046
(0.051) (0.046)
Change in Effective Executive × # Crises in Region 0.017 0.011
(0.014) (0.014)
Polity 2 Score 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.004
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
IMF Program During Previous Crisis -0.007 -0.004 -0.022 -0.013
(0.042) (0.042) (0.047) (0.045)
Imports (% GDP) 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Trade Balance (Exports - Imports % GDP) 0.017∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Central Bank Independence 0.015 0.014 0.015 0.013
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
Presidential System 0.015 0.019 0.028 0.031
(0.057) (0.060) (0.057) (0.059)
GDP per capita (natural log) 0.070 0.079 0.074 0.081
(0.084) (0.085) (0.084) (0.085)
GDP growth 0.011∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Population (natural log) 0.568∗∗ 0.618∗∗∗ 0.565∗∗ 0.608∗∗
(0.230) (0.230) (0.225) (0.229)
Capital Account Openness -0.023 -0.021 -0.023 -0.021
(0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014)
Currency Peg 0.028 0.027 0.023 0.028
(0.036) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035)
Currency Crisis -0.164∗∗∗ -0.169∗∗∗ -0.165∗∗∗ -0.168∗∗∗
(0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033)
Time Trend 0.003 0.001 0.002 0.002
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Constant -6.078 -6.942∗ -6.049 -6.773∗
(3.864) (3.849) (3.768) (3.843)
Observations 1547 1545 1547 1545
Country Fixed Effects X X X X
Country clustered standard errors in parentheses∗ p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01
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Table 23: The Effect of Political Change During Previous Currency Crises upon Reserve
Accumulation - Using the Total Value of Reserves
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unweighted Weighted Unweighted Weighted
Lag of Log Reserves 0.804∗∗∗ 0.805∗∗∗ 0.811∗∗∗ 0.810∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.035) (0.036) (0.036)
Major Cabinet Change 0.068∗ 0.064∗∗
(0.036) (0.031)
Change in Effective Executive 0.051∗ 0.044
(0.029) (0.030)
GDP Change During Previous Crisis -0.083 -0.047 -0.065 -0.081
(0.221) (0.111) (0.102) (0.082)
Major Cabinet Changes × GDP Change During Prev. Crisis 0.189 0.288∗
(0.241) (0.166)
Change in Effective Executive × GDP Change During Prev. Crisis 0.092 0.282
(0.134) (0.169)
Polity 2 Score 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
IMF Program During Previous Crisis 0.003 0.005 -0.014 -0.010
(0.040) (0.039) (0.047) (0.046)
Imports (% GDP) 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.003
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Trade Balance (Exports - Imports % GDP) 0.017∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Central Bank Independence -0.005 -0.007 0.005 0.002
(0.021) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021)
Presidential System -0.016 0.006 0.020 0.035
(0.049) (0.057) (0.057) (0.064)
GDP per capita (natural log) 0.066 0.066 0.085 0.084
(0.090) (0.088) (0.089) (0.087)
GDP growth 0.011∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗ 0.010∗∗ 0.010∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Population (natural log) 0.716∗∗∗ 0.716∗∗∗ 0.726∗∗∗ 0.732∗∗∗
(0.238) (0.234) (0.228) (0.226)
Capital Account Openness -0.023 -0.022 -0.023∗ -0.023∗
(0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Currency Peg 0.042 0.042 0.026 0.032
(0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035)
Currency Crisis -0.160∗∗∗ -0.169∗∗∗ -0.167∗∗∗ -0.171∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.035) (0.034) (0.034)
Time Trend 0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.000
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Constant -8.388∗∗ -8.389∗∗ -8.778∗∗ -8.874∗∗
(3.970) (3.914) (3.800) (3.765)
Observations 1497 1497 1521 1521
Country Fixed Effects X X X X
Country clustered standard errors in parentheses∗ p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01
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Table 24: The Effect of Political Change During Previous Currency Crises upon Reserve
Accumulation - Using the Total Value of Reserves
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unweighted Unweighted Weighted Weighted
Lag of Log Reserves 0.810∗∗∗ 0.818∗∗∗ 0.809∗∗∗ 0.821∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.031) (0.032) (0.032)
Major Cabinet Change 0.045 0.124∗
(0.081) (0.065)
Change in Effective Executive -0.073 0.002
(0.068) (0.083)
Reserves Spent During Previous Crisis 0.401∗∗∗ 0.235∗∗ 0.260∗∗∗ 0.179∗∗
(0.110) (0.099) (0.080) (0.071)
Pre-Crisis Reserves -0.029 -0.004 0.019 0.011
(0.048) (0.034) (0.042) (0.035)
Major Cabinet Change × Reserves Spent -0.315∗∗ -0.157∗
(0.142) (0.090)
Change in Eff. Exec. × Reserves Spent -0.099 -0.056
(0.112) (0.087)
Major Cabinet Change × Pre-Crisis Reserves 0.082 -0.009
(0.065) (0.047)
Change in Eff. Exec. × Pre-Crisis Reserves 0.123∗∗ 0.061
(0.049) (0.055)
Reserves Spent × Pre-Crisis Reserves -0.271∗∗ -0.066 -0.204∗∗ -0.078∗
(0.106) (0.051) (0.081) (0.046)
Major Cabinet Change × Reserves Spent × Pre-Crisis Reserves 0.259∗∗ 0.195∗∗
(0.121) (0.086)
Change in Eff. Exec. × Reserves Spent × Pre-Crisis Reserves -0.004 0.049
(0.074) (0.064)
Polity 2 Score 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.006
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
IMF Program During Previous Crisis -0.002 0.007 0.018 0.011
(0.031) (0.033) (0.033) (0.037)
Imports (% GDP) 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Trade Balance (Exports - Imports % GDP) 0.019∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Central Bank Independence 0.019 0.018 0.020 0.016
(0.021) (0.021) (0.023) (0.022)
Presidential System 0.040 0.043 0.057 0.053
(0.070) (0.075) (0.070) (0.074)
GDP per capita (natural log) 0.063 0.054 0.066 0.056
(0.083) (0.089) (0.089) (0.092)
GDP growth 0.010∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗ 0.009∗∗ 0.009∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Population (natural log) 0.666∗∗ 0.665∗∗ 0.686∗∗ 0.659∗∗
(0.283) (0.279) (0.283) (0.286)
Capital Account Openness -0.021 -0.021 -0.023 -0.023
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Currency Peg -0.006 -0.002 0.022 0.019
(0.045) (0.047) (0.043) (0.045)
Currency Crisis -0.171∗∗∗ -0.181∗∗∗ -0.183∗∗∗ -0.181∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.037) (0.035) (0.036)
Time Trend 0.004 0.002 0.003 0.002
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Constant -9.161 -9.107∗ -9.601∗ -9.106
(5.486) (5.427) (5.490) (5.567)
Observations 1363 1363 1363 1363
Country Fixed Effects X X X X
Country clustered standard errors in parentheses∗ p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01
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Table 25: The Effect of Political Change During Previous Currency Crises upon Reserve
Accumulation - Using the Total Value of Reserves
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unweighted Weighted Unweighted Weighted
Lag of Log Reserves 0.795∗∗∗ 0.793∗∗∗ 0.793∗∗∗ 0.789∗∗∗
(0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041)
Major Cabinet Change 0.071∗ 0.048
(0.042) (0.032)
Change in Effective Executive 0.082∗ 0.063
(0.046) (0.042)
Real Interest Rate Differential -0.448 -0.061 -0.380 -0.094
(0.283) (0.077) (0.340) (0.108)
Major Cabinet Change × IR Differential 0.320 -0.181
(0.298) (0.175)
Change in Effective Executive × IR Differential 0.261 -0.102
(0.346) (0.209)
Polity 2 Score 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
IMF Program During Previous Crisis -0.011 -0.001 -0.019 -0.010
(0.042) (0.043) (0.044) (0.045)
Imports (% GDP) 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Trade Balance (Exports - Imports % GDP) 0.015∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Central Bank Independence 0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001
(0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023)
Presidential System -0.011 -0.015 -0.005 -0.004
(0.058) (0.064) (0.059) (0.065)
GDP per capita (natural log) 0.132 0.140 0.137 0.148
(0.101) (0.101) (0.102) (0.102)
GDP growth 0.012∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Population (natural log) 0.688∗∗∗ 0.687∗∗∗ 0.688∗∗∗ 0.684∗∗∗
(0.242) (0.242) (0.246) (0.239)
Capital Account Openness -0.026∗ -0.023 -0.025 -0.025∗
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Currency Peg 0.029 0.026 0.023 0.027
(0.043) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042)
Currency Crisis -0.176∗∗∗ -0.182∗∗∗ -0.174∗∗∗ -0.181∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038)
Time Trend 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Constant -8.226∗∗ -8.179∗∗ -8.220∗∗ -8.101∗∗
(3.985) (3.991) (4.052) (3.948)
Observations 1298 1296 1298 1296
Country Fixed Effects X X X X
Country clustered standard errors in parentheses∗ p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01
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Table 26: The Effect of Political Change During Previous Currency Crises upon Reserve
Accumulation - Using the Total Value of Reserves
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unweighted Weighted Unweighted Weighted
Lag of Log Reserves 0.812∗∗∗ 0.812∗∗∗ 0.812∗∗∗ 0.811∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036)
Major Cabinet Change 0.059∗ 0.051
(0.035) (0.040)
Change in Effective Executive 0.068∗ 0.065
(0.039) (0.051)
Central Bank Independence 0.037 0.022 0.016 0.012
(0.031) (0.028) (0.022) (0.023)
Major Cabinet Change × CBI -0.032 -0.023
(0.035) (0.044)
Change in Effective Executive × CBI -0.006 -0.005
(0.036) (0.055)
Polity 2 Score 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
IMF Program During Previous Crisis -0.000 -0.002 -0.013 -0.009
(0.040) (0.041) (0.045) (0.044)
Imports (% GDP) 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Trade Balance (Exports - Imports % GDP) 0.017∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Presidential System 0.012 0.016 0.023 0.026
(0.057) (0.060) (0.057) (0.059)
GDP per capita (natural log) 0.072 0.083 0.076 0.082
(0.086) (0.085) (0.086) (0.086)
GDP growth 0.011∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Population (natural log) 0.595∗∗ 0.646∗∗∗ 0.606∗∗∗ 0.633∗∗∗
(0.225) (0.224) (0.223) (0.227)
Capital Account Openness -0.021 -0.020 -0.021 -0.020
(0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013)
Currency Peg 0.026 0.025 0.024 0.028
(0.036) (0.035) (0.036) (0.035)
Currency Crisis -0.166∗∗∗ -0.171∗∗∗ -0.168∗∗∗ -0.170∗∗∗
(0.033) (0.033) (0.034) (0.034)
Time Trend 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Constant -6.601∗ -7.483∗ -6.794∗ -7.256∗
(3.756) (3.753) (3.734) (3.795)
Observations 1547 1545 1547 1545
Country Fixed Effects X X X X
Country clustered standard errors in parentheses∗ p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01
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Table 27: Controlling for Regional Fixed Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unweighted Weighted Unweighted Weighted
Lag of Log Reserves 0.891∗∗∗ 0.892∗∗∗ 0.891∗∗∗ 0.890∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.028)
Major Cabinet Change 0.043∗∗ 0.044∗∗
(0.018) (0.019)
Change in Effective Executive 0.053∗∗∗ 0.058∗∗
(0.019) (0.022)
Polity 2 Score 0.005∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗ 0.005∗∗ 0.005∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
IMF Program During Previous Crisis 0.014 0.018 0.009 0.015
(0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021)
Imports (% GDP) -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Trade Balance (Exports - Imports % GDP) 0.009∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Central Bank Independence -0.003 -0.006 -0.000 -0.003
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Presidential System 0.010 0.021 0.026 0.030
(0.030) (0.030) (0.029) (0.030)
GDP per capita (natural log) -0.044∗∗∗ -0.042∗∗∗ -0.041∗∗∗ -0.040∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
GDP growth -0.010∗∗ -0.010∗∗ -0.010∗∗ -0.010∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Population (natural log) 0.022∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Capital Account Openness -0.016∗∗ -0.016∗∗ -0.013∗∗ -0.013∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006)
Currency Peg 0.008 0.010 0.010 0.010
(0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
Currency Crisis -0.095∗∗∗ -0.097∗∗∗ -0.099∗∗∗ -0.099∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
Time Trend 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 1479 1477 1479 1477
Region Fixed Effects X X X X
Country clustered standard errors in parentheses∗ p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01
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Table 28: Controlling for Regional Fixed Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unweighted Weighted Unweighted Weighted
Lag of Log Reserves 0.888∗∗∗ 0.889∗∗∗ 0.888∗∗∗ 0.888∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.028)
Major Cabinet Change 0.013 0.034
(0.026) (0.028)
Change in Effective Executive 0.044∗ 0.066∗∗
(0.026) (0.029)
# Currency Crises in Region During Prev. Crisis -0.019∗∗∗ -0.013∗ -0.010 -0.009
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
Major Cabinet Changes × # Crises in Region 0.014∗∗ 0.006
(0.006) (0.007)
Change in Effective Executive × # Crises in Region 0.003 -0.002
(0.007) (0.006)
Polity 2 Score 0.005∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗ 0.005∗∗ 0.005∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
IMF Program During Previous Crisis 0.013 0.017 0.008 0.014
(0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021)
Imports (% GDP) 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Trade Balance (Exports - Imports % GDP) 0.009∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Central Bank Independence -0.004 -0.007 -0.000 -0.003
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Presidential System 0.012 0.020 0.024 0.028
(0.030) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031)
GDP per capita (natural log) -0.042∗∗∗ -0.042∗∗∗ -0.040∗∗∗ -0.040∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.011) (0.013) (0.012)
GDP growth -0.010∗∗ -0.010∗∗ -0.010∗∗ -0.010∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Population (natural log) 0.021∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Capital Account Openness -0.015∗∗ -0.016∗∗ -0.014∗∗ -0.014∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
Currency Peg 0.006 0.010 0.011 0.013
(0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
Currency Crisis -0.094∗∗∗ -0.098∗∗∗ -0.100∗∗∗ -0.102∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
Time Trend 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 1479 1477 1479 1477
Region Fixed Effects X X X X
Country clustered standard errors in parentheses∗ p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01
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Table 29: Controlling for Regional Fixed Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unweighted Weighted Unweighted Weighted
Lag of Log Reserves 0.893∗∗∗ 0.893∗∗∗ 0.890∗∗∗ 0.892∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.027) (0.028) (0.027)
Major Cabinet Change 0.043∗∗ 0.042∗∗
(0.018) (0.020)
Change in Effective Executive 0.053∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗
(0.019) (0.022)
GDP Change During Previous Crisis 0.068 -0.046 0.033 -0.020
(0.121) (0.069) (0.093) (0.072)
Major Cabinet Changes × GDP Change During Prev. Crisis -0.096 0.116
(0.122) (0.102)
Change in Effective Executive × GDP Change During Prev. Crisis -0.104 0.007
(0.105) (0.118)
Polity 2 Score 0.005∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗ 0.005∗∗ 0.005∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
IMF Program During Previous Crisis 0.018 0.022 0.011 0.015
(0.020) (0.020) (0.022) (0.021)
Imports (% GDP) -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Trade Balance (Exports - Imports % GDP) 0.009∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Central Bank Independence -0.005 -0.008 -0.002 -0.003
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Presidential System 0.002 0.006 0.024 0.025
(0.030) (0.030) (0.031) (0.032)
GDP per capita (natural log) -0.044∗∗∗ -0.044∗∗∗ -0.039∗∗∗ -0.039∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013)
GDP growth -0.010∗∗ -0.010∗∗ -0.011∗∗ -0.011∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Population (natural log) 0.023∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008)
Capital Account Openness -0.015∗∗ -0.015∗∗ -0.014∗∗ -0.014∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Currency Peg 0.009 0.015 0.007 0.010
(0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021)
Currency Crisis -0.091∗∗∗ -0.094∗∗∗ -0.099∗∗∗ -0.099∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
Time Trend 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 1429 1429 1453 1453
Region Fixed Effects X X X X
Country clustered standard errors in parentheses∗ p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01
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Table 30: Controlling for Regional Fixed Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unweighted Unweighted Weighted Weighted
Lag of Log Reserves 0.857∗∗∗ 0.863∗∗∗ 0.855∗∗∗ 0.861∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028)
Major Cabinet Change 0.018 0.055
(0.045) (0.047)
Change in Effective Executive 0.001 0.005
(0.033) (0.057)
Reserves Spent During Previous Crisis 0.267∗∗∗ 0.113∗∗∗ 0.198∗∗∗ 0.112∗∗∗
(0.081) (0.041) (0.050) (0.035)
Pre-Crisis Reserves 0.028 0.032 0.046∗ 0.039∗
(0.028) (0.021) (0.025) (0.021)
Major Cabinet Change × Reserves Spent -0.193∗∗ -0.150∗∗
(0.090) (0.071)
Change in Eff. Exec. × Reserves Spent -0.001 -0.000
(0.046) (0.078)
Major Cabinet Change × Pre-Crisis Reserves 0.025 -0.000
(0.035) (0.036)
Change in Eff. Exec. × Pre-Crisis Reserves 0.028 0.025
(0.021) (0.036)
Reserves Spent × Pre-Crisis Reserves -0.123 -0.048 -0.136∗∗ -0.064∗∗
(0.085) (0.030) (0.054) (0.027)
Major Cabinet Change × Reserves Spent × Pre-Crisis Reserves 0.061 0.101
(0.087) (0.066)
Change in Eff. Exec. × Reserves Spent × Pre-Crisis Reserves -0.048 -0.018
(0.040) (0.061)
Polity 2 Score 0.007∗∗ 0.006∗∗ 0.006∗∗ 0.006∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
IMF Program During Previous Crisis -0.012 -0.002 -0.003 -0.001
(0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.019)
Imports (% GDP) -0.002∗∗ -0.002∗∗ -0.002∗∗ -0.002∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Trade Balance (Exports - Imports % GDP) 0.012∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Central Bank Independence 0.014 0.016 0.011 0.016
(0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013)
Presidential System 0.007 0.007 0.001 0.007
(0.036) (0.037) (0.038) (0.036)
GDP per capita (natural log) -0.081∗∗∗ -0.070∗∗∗ -0.076∗∗∗ -0.070∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016)
GDP growth -0.010∗∗ -0.010∗∗ -0.009∗∗ -0.009∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Population (natural log) -0.017 -0.015 -0.013 -0.014
(0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Capital Account Openness -0.009 -0.007 -0.012 -0.009
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Currency Peg -0.023 -0.016 -0.013 -0.012
(0.024) (0.025) (0.024) (0.024)
Currency Crisis -0.126∗∗∗ -0.132∗∗∗ -0.128∗∗∗ -0.130∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029)
Time Trend 0.003∗∗ 0.003∗ 0.004∗∗ 0.003∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Constant 0.986∗∗∗ 0.887∗∗∗ 0.852∗∗∗ 0.852∗∗∗
(0.275) (0.253) (0.281) (0.260)
Observations 1352 1352 1352 1352
Region Fixed Effects X X X X
Country clustered standard errors in parentheses∗ p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01
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Table 31: Controlling for Regional Fixed Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unweighted Weighted Unweighted Weighted
Lag of Log Reserves 0.884∗∗∗ 0.885∗∗∗ 0.881∗∗∗ 0.881∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.030) (0.032) (0.032)
Major Cabinet Change 0.030 0.023
(0.027) (0.022)
Change in Effective Executive 0.026 0.020
(0.026) (0.025)
Real Interest Rate Differential -0.085 0.011 -0.022 0.014
(0.233) (0.057) (0.224) (0.065)
Major Cabinet Change × IR Differential -0.003 -0.245∗
(0.240) (0.142)
Change in Effective Executive × IR Differential -0.071 -0.272∗
(0.232) (0.139)
Polity 2 Score 0.005∗∗ 0.005∗∗ 0.005∗∗ 0.005∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
IMF Program During Previous Crisis 0.009 0.016 0.008 0.015
(0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.022)
Imports (% GDP) -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Trade Balance (Exports - Imports % GDP) 0.009∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Central Bank Independence -0.014 -0.016 -0.013 -0.013
(0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013)
Presidential System 0.009 0.016 0.020 0.023
(0.031) (0.032) (0.031) (0.032)
GDP per capita (natural log) -0.040∗∗∗ -0.039∗∗∗ -0.036∗∗∗ -0.035∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013)
GDP growth -0.009∗∗ -0.009∗∗ -0.009∗∗ -0.009∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Population (natural log) 0.021∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗ 0.020∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
Capital Account Openness -0.016∗∗ -0.015∗ -0.015∗ -0.014∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007)
Currency Peg 0.010 0.011 0.010 0.010
(0.025) (0.024) (0.024) (0.025)
Currency Crisis -0.106∗∗∗ -0.111∗∗∗ -0.109∗∗∗ -0.113∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.028) (0.027) (0.027)
Time Trend 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Observations 1248 1246 1248 1246
Region Fixed Effects X X X X
Country clustered standard errors in parentheses∗ p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01
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Table 32: Controlling for Regional Fixed Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unweighted Weighted Unweighted Weighted
Lag of Log Reserves 0.892∗∗∗ 0.892∗∗∗ 0.891∗∗∗ 0.890∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
Major Cabinet Change 0.032 0.036
(0.023) (0.028)
Change in Effective Executive 0.048 0.058
(0.030) (0.039)
Central Bank Independence 0.008 -0.002 0.002 -0.003
(0.015) (0.016) (0.012) (0.012)
Major Cabinet Change × CBI -0.017 -0.010
(0.018) (0.026)
Change in Effective Executive × CBI -0.006 0.000
(0.023) (0.033)
Polity 2 Score 0.005∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗ 0.005∗∗ 0.005∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
IMF Program During Previous Crisis 0.015 0.018 0.009 0.015
(0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021)
Imports (% GDP) -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Trade Balance (Exports - Imports % GDP) 0.009∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Presidential System 0.010 0.021 0.026 0.030
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030)
GDP per capita (natural log) -0.043∗∗∗ -0.042∗∗∗ -0.041∗∗∗ -0.040∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
GDP growth -0.010∗∗ -0.010∗∗ -0.010∗∗ -0.010∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Population (natural log) 0.022∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Capital Account Openness -0.016∗∗ -0.016∗∗ -0.013∗∗ -0.013∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Currency Peg 0.008 0.010 0.010 0.010
(0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
Currency Crisis -0.096∗∗∗ -0.097∗∗∗ -0.099∗∗∗ -0.099∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
Time Trend 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 1479 1477 1479 1477
Region Fixed Effects X X X X
Country clustered standard errors in parentheses∗ p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01
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Table 33: Accounting for Sample Selection with Heckman Selection Models
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unweighted Unweighted Weighted Weighted
Outcome Equation
Lag of Log Reserves 0.805∗∗∗ 0.806∗∗∗ 0.804∗∗∗ 0.803∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Major Cabinet Change 0.056∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.022)
Change in Effective Executive 0.063∗∗∗ 0.072∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.025)
Polity 2 Score 0.006∗∗ 0.006∗∗ 0.006∗∗ 0.006∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
IMF Program During Previous Crisis -0.015 -0.022 -0.014 -0.019
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
Imports (% GDP) -0.003∗∗ -0.003∗∗ -0.003∗∗ -0.003∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Trade Balance (Exports - Imports % GDP) 0.013∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Central Bank Independence 0.015 0.015 0.013 0.012
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Presidential System 0.088∗ 0.100∗∗ 0.090∗ 0.105∗∗
(0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049)
GDP per capita (natural log) -0.118∗∗∗ -0.115∗∗∗ -0.108∗∗∗ -0.108∗∗∗
(0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033)
GDP growth -0.007∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Population (natural log) 0.311∗∗ 0.316∗∗ 0.355∗∗∗ 0.347∗∗∗
(0.134) (0.134) (0.134) (0.134)
Capital Account Openness -0.028∗∗ -0.028∗∗ -0.026∗∗ -0.026∗∗
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Currency Peg 0.001 -0.002 -0.002 0.001
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
Currency Crisis -0.121∗∗∗ -0.122∗∗∗ -0.125∗∗∗ -0.126∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
Time Trend 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.003
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Constant -5.047∗ -5.130∗ -5.952∗∗ -5.755∗∗
(2.682) (2.678) (2.688) (2.689)
Selection Equation
GDP per capita (natural log) -0.051 -0.051 -0.051 -0.051
(0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037)
GDP growth -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Capital Account Openness -0.276∗∗∗ -0.276∗∗∗ -0.275∗∗∗ -0.275∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035)
Currency Peg -0.579∗∗∗ -0.579∗∗∗ -0.579∗∗∗ -0.579∗∗∗
(0.084) (0.084) (0.084) (0.084)
Trade Balance (Exports - Imports % GDP) -0.032∗∗∗ -0.032∗∗∗ -0.032∗∗∗ -0.032∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Time Trend 1.013∗∗∗ 1.013∗∗∗ 1.014∗∗∗ 1.014∗∗∗
(0.141) (0.141) (0.141) (0.141)
Time Trend Squared -0.027∗∗∗ -0.027∗∗∗ -0.027∗∗∗ -0.027∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Time Trend Cubed 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant -10.858∗∗∗ -10.858∗∗∗ -10.867∗∗∗ -10.867∗∗∗
(1.337) (1.337) (1.338) (1.338)
Inverse-Mills Ratio
λ 0.141∗∗∗ 0.143∗∗∗ 0.141∗∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗
(0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053)
Observations 2065 2065 2063 2063
Country Fixed Effects X X X X
Standard errors in parentheses∗ p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01 77
Table 34: Log Reserves in Months of Imports - Crises in Neighbourhood when Own
Occurs with Heckman Selection Model
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unweighted Weighted Unweighted Weighted
Outcome Equation
Lag of Log of Reserves 0.804∗∗∗ 0.803∗∗∗ 0.806∗∗∗ 0.802∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Major Cabinet Change 0.029 0.047
(0.031) (0.031)
Change in Effective Executive 0.043 0.068∗
(0.034) (0.036)
# Crises in Region During Previous Crisis -0.012 -0.008 -0.009 -0.007
(0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Major Cabinet Change × # Crises in Region During Previous Crisis 0.012 0.006
(0.010) (0.009)
Change in Effective Executive × # Crises in Region During Previous Crisis 0.008 0.003
(0.010) (0.010)
Polity 2 Score 0.006∗∗ 0.006∗∗ 0.006∗∗ 0.006∗∗
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
IMF Program During Previous Crisis -0.017 -0.015 -0.026 -0.020
(0.026) (0.026) (0.027) (0.026)
Imports (% GDP) -0.003∗∗ -0.003∗∗ -0.003∗∗ -0.003∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Trade Balance (Exports - Imports % GDP) 0.013∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Central Bank Independence 0.015 0.014 0.016 0.014
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Presidential System 0.090∗ 0.094∗ 0.101∗∗ 0.107∗∗
(0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049)
GDP per capita (natural log) -0.120∗∗∗ -0.110∗∗∗ -0.117∗∗∗ -0.109∗∗∗
(0.033) (0.034) (0.033) (0.034)
GDP growth -0.007∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Population (natural log) 0.293∗∗ 0.345∗∗ 0.296∗∗ 0.335∗∗
(0.135) (0.135) (0.135) (0.135)
Capital Account Openness -0.028∗∗ -0.026∗∗ -0.028∗∗ -0.026∗∗
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Currency Peg 0.000 -0.001 -0.002 0.003
(0.025) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
Currency Crisis -0.119∗∗∗ -0.124∗∗∗ -0.121∗∗∗ -0.125∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
Time Trend 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.004
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Constant -4.653∗ -5.746∗∗ -4.731∗ -5.523∗∗
(2.697) (2.696) (2.700) (2.700)
Selection Equation
GDP per capita (natural log) -0.051 -0.051 -0.051 -0.051
(0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037)
GDP growth -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Capital Account Openness -0.276∗∗∗ -0.275∗∗∗ -0.276∗∗∗ -0.275∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035)
Currency Peg -0.579∗∗∗ -0.579∗∗∗ -0.579∗∗∗ -0.579∗∗∗
(0.084) (0.084) (0.084) (0.084)
Trade Balance (Exports - Imports % GDP) -0.032∗∗∗ -0.032∗∗∗ -0.032∗∗∗ -0.032∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Time Trend 1.013∗∗∗ 1.014∗∗∗ 1.013∗∗∗ 1.014∗∗∗
(0.141) (0.141) (0.141) (0.141)
Time Trend Squared -0.027∗∗∗ -0.027∗∗∗ -0.027∗∗∗ -0.027∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Time Trend Cubed 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant -10.858∗∗∗ -10.867∗∗∗ -10.858∗∗∗ -10.867∗∗∗
(1.337) (1.338) (1.337) (1.338)
Inverse-Mills Ratio
λ 0.136∗∗ 0.135∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗ 0.134∗∗
(0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053)
Observations 2065 2063 2065 2063
Country Fixed Effects X X X X
Standard errors in parentheses∗ p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01
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Table 35: Log Reserves in Months of Imports - Economic Severity of the Previous
Currency Crisis with Heckman Selection Model
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unweighted Weighted Unweighted Weighted
Outcome Equation
Lag of Log of Reserves 0.791∗∗∗ 0.790∗∗∗ 0.804∗∗∗ 0.801∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016)
Major Cabinet Change 0.047∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.022)
GDP Change During Previous Crisis -0.134 -0.090 -0.041 -0.056
(0.126) (0.091) (0.085) (0.071)
Major Cabinet Change × GDP Change During Previous Crisis 0.244∗ 0.343∗∗
(0.142) (0.140)
Change in Effective Executive 0.044∗ 0.053∗∗
(0.024) (0.025)
Change in Effective Executive × GDP Change During Previous Crisis 0.072 0.219
(0.113) (0.138)
Polity 2 Score 0.004∗ 0.004 0.005∗∗ 0.005∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
IMF Program During Previous Crisis -0.003 -0.001 -0.020 -0.018
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.026)
Imports (% GDP) -0.004∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗ -0.004∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Trade Balance (Exports - Imports % GDP) 0.013∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Central Bank Independence -0.001 -0.002 0.008 0.006
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Presidential System 0.062 0.084∗ 0.096∗ 0.111∗∗
(0.050) (0.050) (0.049) (0.050)
GDP per capita (natural log) -0.127∗∗∗ -0.127∗∗∗ -0.112∗∗∗ -0.110∗∗∗
(0.036) (0.036) (0.035) (0.035)
GDP growth -0.007∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Population (natural log) 0.434∗∗∗ 0.437∗∗∗ 0.417∗∗∗ 0.426∗∗∗
(0.141) (0.140) (0.139) (0.139)
Capital Account Openness -0.029∗∗∗ -0.030∗∗∗ -0.030∗∗∗ -0.030∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Currency Peg 0.023 0.023 0.002 0.008
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.025)
Currency Crisis -0.116∗∗∗ -0.125∗∗∗ -0.120∗∗∗ -0.124∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
Time Trend 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Constant -7.205∗∗ -7.299∗∗∗ -7.037∗∗ -7.213∗∗∗
(2.825) (2.803) (2.793) (2.785)
Selection Equation
GDP per capita (natural log) -0.044 -0.044 -0.045 -0.045
(0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037)
GDP growth -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Capital Account Openness -0.275∗∗∗ -0.275∗∗∗ -0.279∗∗∗ -0.279∗∗∗
(0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036)
Currency Peg -0.565∗∗∗ -0.565∗∗∗ -0.565∗∗∗ -0.565∗∗∗
(0.085) (0.085) (0.084) (0.084)
Trade Balance (Exports - Imports % GDP) -0.034∗∗∗ -0.034∗∗∗ -0.032∗∗∗ -0.032∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Time Trend 1.013∗∗∗ 1.013∗∗∗ 1.006∗∗∗ 1.006∗∗∗
(0.142) (0.142) (0.142) (0.142)
Time Trend Squared -0.027∗∗∗ -0.027∗∗∗ -0.027∗∗∗ -0.027∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Time Trend Cubed 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant -10.935∗∗∗ -10.935∗∗∗ -10.865∗∗∗ -10.865∗∗∗
(1.347) (1.347) (1.339) (1.339)
Inverse-Mills Ratio
λ 0.125∗∗ 0.124∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗ 0.134∗∗
(0.054) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053)
Observations 2015 2015 2039 2039
Country Fixed Effects X X X X
Standard errors in parentheses∗ p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01
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Table 36: Log Reserves in Months of Imports with Heckman Selection Model
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log fi res totl mo log fi res totl mo log fi res totl mo log fi res totl mo
Outcome Equation
Lag of Log Reserves 0.807∗∗∗ 0.811∗∗∗ 0.802∗∗∗ 0.812∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.018) (0.019) (0.018)
Major Cabinet Change 0.025 0.065∗
(0.038) (0.037)
Change in Effective Executive -0.046 0.020
(0.048) (0.056)
Reserves Spent During Previous Crisis 0.301∗∗∗ 0.201∗∗∗ 0.235∗∗∗ 0.165∗∗∗
(0.058) (0.047) (0.043) (0.039)
Pre-Crisis Reserves -0.030 -0.016 -0.020 -0.010
(0.030) (0.023) (0.026) (0.023)
Major Cabinet Change × Reserves Spent -0.229∗∗∗ -0.158∗∗∗
(0.067) (0.054)
Change in Effective Executive × Reserves Spent -0.105 -0.107
(0.068) (0.068)
Major Cabinet Change × Pre-Crisis Reserves 0.052 0.028
(0.034) (0.033)
Change in Effective Executive × Pre-Crisis Reserves 0.076∗∗ 0.037
(0.035) (0.041)
Reserves Spent During Previous Crisis × Pre-Crisis Reserves -0.203∗∗∗ -0.081∗∗ -0.224∗∗∗ -0.099∗∗∗
(0.066) (0.034) (0.048) (0.031)
Major Cabinet Change × Reserves Spent × Pre-Crisis Reserves 0.160∗∗ 0.194∗∗∗
(0.071) (0.054)
Change in Effective Executive × Reserves Spent × Pre-Crisis Reserves 0.004 0.081
(0.057) (0.060)
Polity 2 Score 0.006∗ 0.006∗∗ 0.006∗ 0.006∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
IMF Program During Previous Crisis -0.031 -0.025 -0.018 -0.025
(0.027) (0.028) (0.027) (0.028)
Imports (% GDP) -0.003∗∗ -0.003∗∗ -0.003∗∗ -0.003∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Trade Balance (Exports - Imports % GDP) 0.015∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Central Bank Independence 0.018 0.018 0.020 0.016
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Presidential System 0.101∗∗ 0.100∗∗ 0.122∗∗ 0.112∗∗
(0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049)
GDP per capita (natural log) -0.154∗∗∗ -0.153∗∗∗ -0.149∗∗∗ -0.150∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037)
GDP growth -0.008∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Population (natural log) 0.283∗ 0.300∗∗ 0.311∗∗ 0.283∗
(0.150) (0.147) (0.148) (0.147)
Capital Account Openness -0.005 -0.006 -0.005 -0.007
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Currency Peg 0.001 0.001 0.020 0.017
(0.025) (0.025) (0.024) (0.024)
Currency Crisis -0.135∗∗∗ -0.143∗∗∗ -0.143∗∗∗ -0.143∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022)
Time Trend 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.002
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Constant -4.034 -4.294 -4.665 -4.020
(2.994) (2.947) (2.958) (2.946)
Selection Equation
GDP per capita (natural log) -0.645∗ -0.645∗ -0.645∗ -0.645∗
(0.378) (0.378) (0.378) (0.378)
GDP growth 0.124∗ 0.124∗ 0.124∗ 0.124∗
(0.064) (0.064) (0.064) (0.064)
Capital Account Openness -18.405∗∗∗ -18.405∗∗∗ -18.405∗∗∗ -18.405∗∗∗
(6.769) (6.769) (6.769) (6.769)
Currency Peg -0.134 -0.134 -0.134 -0.134
(0.293) (0.293) (0.293) (0.293)
Trade Balance (Exports - Imports % GDP) 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004
(0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029)
Time Trend -2.108 -2.108 -2.108 -2.108
(1.454) (1.454) (1.454) (1.454)
Time Trend Squared 0.061 0.061 0.061 0.061
(0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041)
Time Trend Cubed -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant 75.139 75.139 75.139 75.139
(.) (.) (.) (.)
Inverse-Mills Ratio
λ -0.200 -0.193 -0.222 -0.185
(0.145) (0.146) (0.143) (0.146)
Observations 1372 1372 1372 1372
Country Fixed Effects X X X X
Standard errors in parentheses∗ p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01
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Table 37: Log Reserves in Months of Imports with Heckman Selection Model
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unweighted Weighted Unweighted Weighted
Outcome Equation
Lag of Log Reserves 0.782∗∗∗ 0.780∗∗∗ 0.780∗∗∗ 0.776∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
Major Cabinet Change 0.015 0.026
(0.033) (0.031)
Real Interest Rate Differential -0.000 0.066 -0.000 0.102
(0.225) (0.164) (0.172) (0.147)
Major Cabinet Change × Real Interest Rate Differential -0.110 -0.313
(0.245) (0.246)
Change in Effective Executive 0.034 0.017
(0.030) (0.035)
Change in Effective Executive × Real Interest Rate Differential -0.138 -0.552∗∗
(0.216) (0.263)
Polity 2 Score 0.007∗∗ 0.007∗∗ 0.007∗∗ 0.006∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
IMF Program During Previous Crisis -0.013 -0.012 -0.019 -0.013
(0.028) (0.028) (0.029) (0.029)
Imports (% GDP) -0.005∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Trade Balance (Exports - Imports % GDP) 0.011∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Central Bank Independence 0.004 0.003 0.005 0.004
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Presidential System 0.111∗∗ 0.107∗∗ 0.117∗∗ 0.117∗∗
(0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052)
GDP per capita (natural log) -0.125∗∗∗ -0.119∗∗∗ -0.124∗∗∗ -0.116∗∗∗
(0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036)
GDP growth -0.009∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Population (natural log) 0.221 0.240 0.214 0.226
(0.153) (0.153) (0.152) (0.153)
Capital Account Openness -0.035∗∗∗ -0.033∗∗ -0.037∗∗∗ -0.035∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Currency Peg -0.008 -0.013 -0.011 -0.012
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030)
Currency Crisis -0.133∗∗∗ -0.137∗∗∗ -0.133∗∗∗ -0.139∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
Time Trend 0.008∗ 0.007∗ 0.008∗ 0.008∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Constant -2.769 -3.095 -2.683 -2.914
(2.455) (2.461) (2.443) (2.448)
Selection Equation
GDP per capita (natural log) -0.020 -0.020 -0.020 -0.020
(0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043)
GDP growth 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Capital Account Openness -0.303∗∗∗ -0.303∗∗∗ -0.303∗∗∗ -0.303∗∗∗
(0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042)
Currency Peg -0.809∗∗∗ -0.808∗∗∗ -0.809∗∗∗ -0.808∗∗∗
(0.106) (0.106) (0.106) (0.106)
Trade Balance (Exports - Imports % GDP) -0.044∗∗∗ -0.044∗∗∗ -0.044∗∗∗ -0.044∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Time Trend 0.792∗∗∗ 0.794∗∗∗ 0.792∗∗∗ 0.794∗∗∗
(0.182) (0.182) (0.182) (0.182)
Time Trend Squared -0.021∗∗∗ -0.021∗∗∗ -0.021∗∗∗ -0.021∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Time Trend Cubed 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant -8.470∗∗∗ -8.483∗∗∗ -8.470∗∗∗ -8.483∗∗∗
(1.768) (1.769) (1.768) (1.769)
Inverse-Mills Ratio
λ 0.179∗∗ 0.185∗∗ 0.183∗∗ 0.187∗∗
(0.077) (0.077) (0.077) (0.076)
Observations 1538 1536 1538 1536
Country Fixed Effects X X X X
Standard errors in parentheses∗ p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01
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Table 38: Log Reserves in Months of Imports with Heckman Selection Model
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unweighted Weighted Unweighted Weighted
Outcome Equation
Lag of Log Reserves 0.806∗∗∗ 0.804∗∗∗ 0.806∗∗∗ 0.803∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Major Cabinet Change 0.047 0.044
(0.029) (0.031)
Central Bank Independence 0.025 0.023 0.016 0.014
(0.025) (0.020) (0.019) (0.017)
Major Cabinet Change × Central Bank Independence -0.014 -0.021
(0.028) (0.029)
Change in Effective Executive 0.062∗∗ 0.068∗
(0.032) (0.036)
Change in Effective Executive × Central Bank Independence -0.001 -0.004
(0.027) (0.032)
Polity 2 Score 0.006∗∗ 0.006∗∗ 0.006∗∗ 0.006∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
IMF Program (lasting ¿ 5 month) During Previous Crisis -0.013 -0.012 -0.022 -0.019
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
Imports (% GDP) -0.003∗∗ -0.003∗∗ -0.003∗∗ -0.003∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Trade Balance (Exports - Imports % GDP) 0.013∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Presidential System (DPI) 0.088∗ 0.092∗ 0.100∗∗ 0.105∗∗
(0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049)
GDP per capita (natural log) -0.117∗∗∗ -0.106∗∗∗ -0.115∗∗∗ -0.108∗∗∗
(0.033) (0.034) (0.033) (0.033)
GDP growth -0.007∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Population (natural log) 0.311∗∗ 0.367∗∗∗ 0.316∗∗ 0.348∗∗∗
(0.134) (0.135) (0.134) (0.135)
Capital Account Openness -0.028∗∗ -0.026∗∗ -0.028∗∗ -0.026∗∗
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Currency Peg -0.000 -0.003 -0.002 0.001
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
Currency Crisis -0.121∗∗∗ -0.125∗∗∗ -0.122∗∗∗ -0.125∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
Time Trend 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.003
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Constant -5.044∗ -6.182∗∗ -5.128∗ -5.777∗∗
(2.682) (2.707) (2.678) (2.694)
Selection Equation
GDP per capita (natural log) -0.051 -0.051 -0.051 -0.051
(0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037)
GDP growth -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Capital Account Openness -0.276∗∗∗ -0.275∗∗∗ -0.276∗∗∗ -0.275∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035)
Currency Peg -0.579∗∗∗ -0.579∗∗∗ -0.579∗∗∗ -0.579∗∗∗
(0.084) (0.084) (0.084) (0.084)
Trade Balance (Exports - Imports % GDP) -0.032∗∗∗ -0.032∗∗∗ -0.032∗∗∗ -0.032∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Time Trend 1.013∗∗∗ 1.014∗∗∗ 1.013∗∗∗ 1.014∗∗∗
(0.141) (0.141) (0.141) (0.141)
Time Trend Squared -0.027∗∗∗ -0.027∗∗∗ -0.027∗∗∗ -0.027∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Time Trend Cubed 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant -10.858∗∗∗ -10.867∗∗∗ -10.858∗∗∗ -10.867∗∗∗
(1.337) (1.338) (1.337) (1.338)
Inverse-Mills Ratio
λ 0.141∗∗∗ 0.140∗∗∗ 0.143∗∗∗ 0.138∗∗∗
(0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053)
Observations 2065 2063 2065 2063
Country Fixed Effects X X X X
Standard errors in parentheses∗ p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01
82
Table 39: Setting Missing Values in the Political Change Variables to 0.5
(1) (2)
Unweighted Unweighted
Lag of Log Reserves 0.776∗∗∗ 0.776∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.028)
Major Cabinet Changes 0.058∗∗
(0.024)
Change in Effective Executive 0.062∗∗
(0.028)
Polity 2 Score 0.006∗∗ 0.006∗∗
(0.003) (0.003)
IMF Program During Previous Crisis 0.011 0.008
(0.032) (0.035)
Imports (% GDP) -0.002 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002)
Trade Balance (Exports - Imports % GDP) 0.009∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002)
Central Bank Independence 0.011 0.010
(0.013) (0.013)
Presidential System 0.155∗∗∗ 0.160∗∗∗
(0.050) (0.050)
GDP per capita (natural log) -0.158∗∗∗ -0.156∗∗∗
(0.043) (0.044)
GDP growth -0.004 -0.004
(0.003) (0.003)
Population (natural log) 0.134 0.135
(0.169) (0.168)
Capital Account Openness 0.006 0.006
(0.012) (0.011)
Currency Peg 0.007 0.006
(0.027) (0.026)
Currency Crisis -0.116∗∗∗ -0.116∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.026)
Time Trend 0.003 0.003
(0.004) (0.004)
Constant -0.886 -0.913
(2.808) (2.788)
Observations 2632 2632
Country Fixed Effects X X
Country clustered standard errors in parentheses∗ p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01
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Table 40: Setting Missing Values in the Political Change Variables to 0.5
(1) (2)
Unweighted Unweighted
Lag of Log Reserves 0.746∗∗∗ 0.747∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.035)
Major Cabinet Change 0.004
(0.038)
Change in Effective Executive 0.026
(0.037)
Real Interest Rate Differential 0.162 0.022
(0.279) (0.242)
Major Cabinet Change × Real Interest Rate Differential -0.265
(0.283)
Change in Effective Executive × Real Interest Rate Differential -0.117
(0.246)
Polity 2 Score 0.008∗∗ 0.007∗∗
(0.003) (0.003)
IMF Program During Previous Crisis 0.014 0.011
(0.037) (0.038)
Imports (% GDP) -0.003∗ -0.003∗
(0.002) (0.002)
Trade Balance (Exports - Imports % GDP) 0.008∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002)
Central Bank Independence -0.009 -0.008
(0.014) (0.014)
Presidential System 0.201∗∗∗ 0.203∗∗∗
(0.057) (0.056)
GDP per capita (natural log) -0.129∗∗∗ -0.130∗∗∗
(0.047) (0.048)
GDP growth -0.003 -0.003
(0.003) (0.003)
Population (natural log) 0.331 0.331
(0.205) (0.204)
Capital Account Openness 0.000 -0.000
(0.013) (0.013)
Currency Peg 0.032 0.032
(0.033) (0.032)
Currency Crisis -0.117∗∗∗ -0.117∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.030)
Time Trend 0.001 0.001
(0.005) (0.005)
Constant -4.165 -4.196
(3.339) (3.334)
Observations 2112 2112
Country Fixed Effects X X
Country clustered standard errors in parentheses∗ p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.0184
Table 41: Setting Missing Values in the Political Change Variables to 0.5
(1) (2)
Unweighted Unweighted
Lag of Log Reserves 0.776∗∗∗ 0.776∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.028)
Major Cabinet Change 0.056∗
(0.031)
Change in Effective Executive 0.052
(0.035)
Central Bank Independence 0.013 0.016
(0.020) 0.014
Major Cabinet Change × Central Bank Independence -0.004
(0.027)
Change in Effective Executive × Central Bank Independence -0.013
(0.027)
Polity 2 Score 0.006∗∗ 0.006∗∗
(0.003) (0.003)
IMF Program During Previous Crisis 0.011 0.009
(0.032) (0.035)
Imports (% GDP) -0.002 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002)
Trade Balance (Exports - Imports % GDP) 0.009∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002)
Presidential System 0.155∗∗∗ 0.160∗∗∗
(0.050) (0.051)
GDP per capita (natural log) -0.158∗∗∗ -0.157∗∗∗
(0.043) (0.044)
GDP growth -0.004 -0.004
(0.003) (0.003)
Population (natural log) 0.134 0.135
(0.169) (0.168)
Capital Account Openness 0.006 0.006
(0.012) (0.012)
Currency Peg 0.007 0.005
(0.026) (0.026)
Currency Crisis -0.116∗∗∗ -0.117∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.026)
Time Trend 0.003 0.003
(0.004) (0.004)
Constant -0.883 -0.909
(2.806) (2.787)
Observations 2632 2632
Country Fixed Effects X X
Country clustered standard errors in parentheses∗ p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01
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Table 42: Setting Missing Values in the Political Change Variables to 0
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unweighted Weighted Unweighted Weighted
Lag of Log Reserves 0.776∗∗∗ 0.776∗∗∗ 0.777∗∗∗ 0.775∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028)
Major Cabinet Change 0.054∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.021)
Change in Effective Executive 0.064∗∗ 0.081∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.029)
Polity 2 Score 0.006∗∗ 0.006∗∗ 0.006∗∗ 0.006∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
IMF Program During Previous Crisis 0.006 0.008 0.002 0.005
(0.032) (0.031) (0.034) (0.033)
Imports (% GDP) -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Trade Balance (Exports - Imports % GDP) 0.009∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Central Bank Independence 0.012 0.011 0.012 0.011
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Presidential System 0.156∗∗∗ 0.156∗∗∗ 0.161∗∗∗ 0.162∗∗∗
(0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050)
GDP per capita (natural log) -0.159∗∗∗ -0.157∗∗∗ -0.157∗∗∗ -0.155∗∗∗
(0.043) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044)
GDP growth -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Population (natural log) 0.132 0.143 0.132 0.139
(0.169) (0.170) (0.168) (0.169)
Capital Account Openness 0.006 0.007 0.006 0.007
(0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Currency Peg 0.007 0.007 0.006 0.009
(0.027) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
Currency Crisis -0.119∗∗∗ -0.123∗∗∗ -0.119∗∗∗ -0.123∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
Time Trend 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Constant -0.823 -1.005 -0.833 -0.947
(2.806) (2.821) (2.787) (2.805)
Observations 2632 2632 2632 2632
Country Fixed Effects X X X X
Country clustered standard errors in parentheses∗ p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01
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Table 43: Setting Missing Values in the Political Change Variables to 0
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unweighted Weighted Unweighted Weighted
Lag of Log Reserves 0.745∗∗∗ 0.747∗∗∗ 0.746∗∗∗ 0.746∗∗∗
(0.036) (0.035) (0.035) (0.036)
Major Cabinet Change 0.016 0.021
(0.032) (0.025)
Change in Effective Executive 0.033 0.041
(0.033) (0.034)
Real Interest Rate Differential 0.109 0.042 0.049 0.026
(0.203) (0.081) (0.187) (0.082)
Major Cabinet Change × Real Interest Rate Differential -0.221 -0.354∗∗
(0.208) (0.177)
Change in Effective Executive × Real Interest Rate Differential -0.157 -0.324∗
(0.191) (0.171)
Polity 2 Score 0.008∗∗ 0.007∗∗ 0.007∗∗ 0.007∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
IMF Program During Previous Crisis 0.011 0.017 0.007 0.013
(0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.038)
Imports (% GDP) -0.003∗ -0.003∗∗ -0.003∗ -0.003∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Trade Balance (Exports - Imports % GDP) 0.008∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Central Bank Independence -0.008 -0.007 -0.008 -0.006
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Presidential System 0.201∗∗∗ 0.194∗∗∗ 0.204∗∗∗ 0.199∗∗∗
(0.056) (0.057) (0.056) (0.057)
GDP per capita (natural log) -0.130∗∗∗ -0.132∗∗∗ -0.130∗∗∗ -0.130∗∗∗
(0.047) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048)
GDP growth -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Population (natural log) 0.327 0.335 0.324 0.328
(0.205) (0.205) (0.203) (0.203)
Capital Account Openness 0.000 0.003 -0.000 0.002
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Currency Peg 0.032 0.035 0.031 0.036
(0.033) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032)
Currency Crisis -0.119∗∗∗ -0.127∗∗∗ -0.119∗∗∗ -0.126∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030)
Time Trend 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Constant -4.104 -4.214 -4.066 -4.127
(3.338) (3.346) (3.318) (3.324)
Observations 2112 2112 2112 2112
Country Fixed Effects X X X X
Country clustered standard errors in parentheses∗ p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01 87
Table 44: Setting Missing Values in the Political Change Variables to 0
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unweighted Weighted Unweighted Weighted
Lag of Log Reserves 0.776∗∗∗ 0.776∗∗∗ 0.777∗∗∗ 0.775∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028)
Major Cabinet Change 0.062∗∗ 0.060∗
(0.028) (0.031)
Central Bank Independence 0.007 0.011 0.009 0.010
(0.016) (0.015) (0.014) (0.013)
Major Cabinet Change × Central Bank Independence 0.011 0.001
(0.023) (0.030)
Change in Effective Executive 0.072∗∗ 0.086∗∗
(0.032) (0.041)
Change in Effective Executive × Central Bank Independence 0.009 0.006
(0.026) (0.037)
Polity 2 Score 0.006∗∗ 0.006∗∗ 0.006∗∗ 0.006∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
IMF Program During Previous Crisis 0.005 0.008 0.002 0.004
(0.031) (0.031) (0.034) (0.033)
Imports (% GDP) -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Trade Balance (Exports - Imports % GDP) 0.009∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Presidential System 0.156∗∗∗ 0.156∗∗∗ 0.161∗∗∗ 0.162∗∗∗
(0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050)
GDP per capita (natural log) -0.159∗∗∗ -0.157∗∗∗ -0.157∗∗∗ -0.155∗∗∗
(0.043) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044)
GDP growth -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Population (natural log) 0.134 0.143 0.133 0.139
(0.169) (0.170) (0.168) (0.169)
Capital Account Openness 0.006 0.007 0.006 0.007
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Currency Peg 0.008 0.007 0.006 0.009
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
Currency Crisis -0.118∗∗∗ -0.123∗∗∗ -0.119∗∗∗ -0.123∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
Time Trend 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Constant -0.851 -1.003 -0.849 -0.945
(2.808) (2.824) (2.786) (2.806)
Observations 2632 2632 2632 2632
Country Fixed Effects X X X X
Country clustered standard errors in parentheses∗ p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01
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Table 45: The Effect of Political Change During Previous Currency Crises upon Reserve
Accumulation Controlling for Changes in the Exchange Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unweighted Weighted Unweighted Weighted
Lag of Log Reserves 0.821∗∗∗ 0.821∗∗∗ 0.822∗∗∗ 0.820∗∗∗
(0.042) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043)
Major Cabinet Change 0.058∗∗ 0.051∗∗
(0.028) (0.023)
Change in Effective Executive 0.061∗∗ 0.063∗∗
(0.026) (0.025)
Polity 2 Score 0.007∗∗ 0.006∗∗ 0.007∗∗ 0.006∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
IMF Program During Previous Crisis 0.000 0.003 -0.007 -0.002
(0.029) (0.028) (0.032) (0.031)
Imports (% GDP) -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Trade Balance (Exports - Imports % GDP) 0.015∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Central Bank Independence 0.023 0.022 0.023 0.021
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Presidential System 0.070 0.070 0.082 0.083
(0.065) (0.066) (0.065) (0.064)
GDP per capita (natural log) -0.103 -0.092 -0.100 -0.092
(0.063) (0.064) (0.064) (0.064)
GDP growth -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Population (natural log) 0.322 0.367 0.327 0.358
(0.228) (0.228) (0.222) (0.225)
Capital Account Openness -0.011 -0.009 -0.011 -0.009
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Currency Peg 0.048 0.045 0.045 0.047
(0.037) (0.036) (0.036) (0.035)
Change in Exchange Rate -0.006 -0.004 -0.007 -0.004
(0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013)
Time Trend 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Constant -4.442 -5.238 -4.545 -5.094
(4.000) (4.000) (3.899) (3.957)
Observations 1433 1431 1433 1431
Country Fixed Effects X X X X
Country clustered standard errors in parentheses∗ p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01
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Table 46: The Effect of Political Change During Previous Currency Crises upon Reserve
Accumulation Controlling for Changes in the Exchange Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unweighted Weighted Unweighted Weighted
Lag of Log Reserves 0.818∗∗∗ 0.818∗∗∗ 0.820∗∗∗ 0.818∗∗∗
(0.040) (0.042) (0.041) (0.042)
Major Cabinet Change 0.022 0.025
(0.044) (0.037)
# Crises in Region During Previous Crisis -0.018 -0.015 -0.014 -0.012
(0.014) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011)
Major Cabinet Change × # Crises in Region During Previous Crisis 0.015 0.012
(0.013) (0.010)
Change in Effective Executive 0.032 0.048
(0.042) (0.041)
Change in Effective Executive × # Crises in Region During Previous Crisis 0.012 0.008
(0.011) (0.010)
Polity 2 Score 0.006∗∗ 0.006∗∗ 0.007∗∗ 0.006∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
IMF Program During Previous Crisis -0.004 0.002 -0.014 -0.005
(0.029) (0.029) (0.032) (0.031)
Imports (% GDP) -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Trade Balance (Exports - Imports % GDP) 0.015∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Central Bank Independence 0.024 0.023 0.025 0.023
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Presidential System 0.073 0.076 0.084 0.086
(0.066) (0.067) (0.066) (0.065)
GDP per capita (natural log) -0.107∗ -0.094 -0.103 -0.094
(0.063) (0.064) (0.063) (0.064)
GDP growth -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Population (natural log) 0.293 0.350 0.294 0.336
(0.230) (0.230) (0.225) (0.229)
Capital Account Openness -0.012 -0.009 -0.012 -0.010
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Currency Peg 0.045 0.043 0.043 0.047
(0.036) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035)
Change in Exchange Rate -0.007 -0.003 -0.008 -0.005
(0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013)
Time Trend 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Constant -3.905 -4.908 -3.960 -4.703
(4.043) (4.043) (3.960) (4.025)
Observations 1433 1431 1433 1431
Country Fixed Effects X X X X
Country clustered standard errors in parentheses∗ p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01
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Table 47: The Effect of Political Change During Previous Currency Crises upon Reserve
Accumulation Controlling for Changes in the Exchange Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unweighted Weighted Unweighted Weighted
Lag of Log Reserves 0.805∗∗∗ 0.805∗∗∗ 0.818∗∗∗ 0.815∗∗∗
(0.043) (0.044) (0.043) (0.043)
Major Cabinet Change 0.049∗ 0.051∗
(0.029) (0.026)
GDP Change During Previous Crisis -0.093 -0.064 -0.019 -0.049
(0.151) (0.101) (0.111) (0.096)
Major Cabinet Change × GDP Change During Previous Crisis 0.197 0.288∗∗
(0.156) (0.122)
Change in Effective Executive 0.043∗ 0.046∗
(0.024) (0.027)
Change in Effective Executive × GDP Change During Previous Crisis 0.042 0.208
(0.127) (0.157)
Polity 2 Score 0.005∗ 0.005 0.006∗∗ 0.006∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
IMF Program During Previous Crisis 0.014 0.018 -0.007 -0.003
(0.027) (0.026) (0.033) (0.031)
Imports (% GDP) -0.004 -0.004∗ -0.003 -0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Trade Balance (Exports - Imports % GDP) 0.015∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Central Bank Independence 0.006 0.005 0.015 0.013
(0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016)
Presidential System 0.044 0.058 0.077 0.089
(0.056) (0.056) (0.065) (0.064)
GDP per capita (natural log) -0.116∗ -0.112 -0.099 -0.096
(0.069) (0.068) (0.068) (0.068)
GDP growth -0.005 -0.005 -0.007∗ -0.007∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Population (natural log) 0.447∗ 0.457∗ 0.433∗ 0.443∗
(0.254) (0.248) (0.240) (0.240)
Capital Account Openness -0.014 -0.014 -0.014 -0.015
(0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013)
Currency Peg 0.066∗ 0.068∗ 0.047 0.052
(0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.036)
Change in Exchange Rate -0.010 -0.006 -0.011 -0.009
(0.015) (0.012) (0.014) (0.013)
Time Trend -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
Constant -6.356 -6.550 -6.263 -6.452
(4.443) (4.352) (4.215) (4.225)
Observations 1384 1384 1408 1408
Country Fixed Effects X X X X
Country clustered standard errors in parentheses∗ p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01
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Table 48: The Effect of Political Change During Previous Currency Crises upon Reserve
Accumulation Controlling for Changes in the Exchange Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unweighted Unweighted Weighted Weighted
Lag of Log Reserves 0.809∗∗∗ 0.815∗∗∗ 0.807∗∗∗ 0.817∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.035) (0.036) (0.036)
Major Cabinet Change 0.035 0.059
(0.069) (0.057)
Change in Effective Executive -0.042 -0.003
(0.052) (0.056)
Reserves Spent During Previous Crisis 0.328∗∗∗ 0.215∗∗ 0.257∗∗∗ 0.188∗∗∗
(0.106) (0.086) (0.066) (0.062)
Pre-Crisis Reserves -0.027 -0.012 -0.012 -0.007
(0.043) (0.032) (0.035) (0.031)
Major Cabinet Change × Reserves Spent -0.240∗∗ -0.166∗∗
(0.119) (0.079)
Change in Effective Executive × Reserves Spent -0.103 -0.113
(0.090) (0.092)
Major Cabinet Change × Pre-Crisis Reserves 0.058 0.031
(0.053) (0.044)
Change in Effective Executive × Pre-Crisis Reserves 0.081∗∗ 0.054
(0.035) (0.041)
Reserves Spent × Pre-Crisis Reserves -0.237∗∗ -0.102∗∗ -0.247∗∗∗ -0.123∗∗∗
(0.099) (0.043) (0.072) (0.042)
Major Cabinet Change × Reserves Spent × Pre-Crisis Reserves 0.179∗ 0.200∗∗
(0.105) (0.077)
Change in Effective Executive × Reserves Spent × Pre-Crisis Reserves 0.015 0.095
(0.057) (0.073)
Polity 2 Score 0.007 0.007∗ 0.007 0.007∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
IMF Program During Previous Crisis -0.022 -0.016 -0.002 -0.011
(0.026) (0.027) (0.027) (0.030)
Imports (% GDP) -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Trade Balance (Exports - Imports % GDP) 0.015∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Central Bank Independence 0.026 0.025 0.029∗ 0.025
(0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
Presidential System 0.081 0.081 0.099 0.088
(0.065) (0.067) (0.067) (0.065)
GDP per capita (natural log) -0.139∗∗ -0.136∗ -0.130∗ -0.131∗
(0.069) (0.073) (0.073) (0.075)
GDP growth -0.006∗ -0.007∗ -0.007∗ -0.007∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Population (natural log) 0.299 0.316 0.351 0.310
(0.281) (0.266) (0.277) (0.268)
Capital Account Openness -0.011 -0.011 -0.008 -0.011
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Currency Peg 0.017 0.019 0.038 0.034
(0.044) (0.044) (0.043) (0.042)
Change in Exchange Rate -0.016 -0.018 -0.007 -0.012
(0.014) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011)
Time Trend 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.003
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Constant -3.712 -3.940 -4.598 -3.907
(4.510) (4.318) (4.472) (4.367)
Observations 1311 1311 1311 1311
Country Fixed Effects X X X X
Country clustered standard errors in parentheses∗ p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01
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Table 49: The Effect of Political Change During Previous Currency Crises upon Reserve
Accumulation Controlling for Changes in the Exchange Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unweighted Weighted Unweighted Weighted
Lag of Log Reserves 0.796∗∗∗ 0.794∗∗∗ 0.796∗∗∗ 0.791∗∗∗
(0.051) (0.050) (0.051) (0.051)
Major Cabinet Change 0.023 0.017
(0.040) (0.031)
Real Interest Rate Differential -0.041 0.020 -0.156 -0.015
(0.246) (0.089) (0.289) (0.112)
Major Cabinet Change × Real Interest Rate Differential -0.020 -0.217
(0.258) (0.263)
Change in Effective Executive 0.053 0.040
(0.035) (0.036)
Change in Effective Executive × Real Interest Rate Differential 0.123 -0.132
(0.295) (0.242)
Polity 2 Score 0.007∗∗ 0.007∗ 0.007∗∗ 0.006∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
IMF Program During Previous Crisis 0.003 0.005 -0.007 0.000
(0.032) (0.030) (0.033) (0.032)
Imports (% GDP) -0.004 -0.004∗ -0.004 -0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Trade Balance (Exports - Imports % GDP) 0.013∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Central Bank Independence 0.009 0.007 0.009 0.008
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
Presidential System 0.091 0.086 0.097 0.096
(0.062) (0.064) (0.062) (0.063)
GDP per capita (natural log) -0.089 -0.085 -0.090 -0.081
(0.072) (0.072) (0.072) (0.073)
GDP growth -0.006 -0.007 -0.006 -0.007
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Population (natural log) 0.355 0.383 0.358 0.381
(0.257) (0.262) (0.256) (0.258)
Capital Account Openness -0.016 -0.013 -0.016 -0.015
(0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Currency Peg 0.038 0.033 0.034 0.035
(0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041)
Change in Exchange Rate -0.010 -0.019 -0.013 -0.015
(0.016) (0.020) (0.016) (0.019)
Time Trend 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
Constant -5.065 -5.538 -5.127 -5.534
(4.468) (4.560) (4.448) (4.507)
Observations 1238 1236 1238 1236
Country Fixed Effects X X X X
Country clustered standard errors in parentheses∗ p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01
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Table 50: The Effect of Political Change During Previous Currency Crises upon Reserve
Accumulation Controlling for Changes in the Exchange Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unweighted Weighted Unweighted Weighted
Lag of Log Reserves 0.821∗∗∗ 0.821∗∗∗ 0.822∗∗∗ 0.819∗∗∗
(0.042) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043)
Major Cabinet Change 0.052∗ 0.033
(0.030) (0.034)
Change in Effective Executive 0.058∗ 0.051
(0.030) (0.036)
Central Bank Independence 0.030 0.032∗ 0.025 0.025
(0.020) (0.018) (0.015) (0.015)
Major Cabinet Change × Central Bank Independence -0.009 -0.023
(0.026) (0.030)
Change in Effective Executive × Central Bank Independence -0.003 -0.015
(0.029) (0.035)
Polity 2 Score 0.007∗∗ 0.006∗∗ 0.007∗∗ 0.006∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
IMF Program During Previous Crisis 0.001 0.006 -0.007 -0.000
(0.029) (0.029) (0.032) (0.031)
Imports (% GDP) -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Trade Balance (Exports - Imports % GDP) 0.015∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Presidential System 0.070 0.071 0.081 0.083
(0.065) (0.065) (0.065) (0.064)
GDP per capita (natural log) -0.103 -0.090 -0.101 -0.092
(0.063) (0.063) (0.064) (0.064)
GDP growth -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Population (natural log) 0.322 0.381∗ 0.327 0.363
(0.228) (0.227) (0.222) (0.226)
Capital Account Openness -0.010 -0.008 -0.011 -0.008
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Currency Peg 0.047 0.044 0.045 0.047
(0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036)
Change in Exchange Rate -0.007 -0.003 -0.008 -0.005
(0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013)
Time Trend 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Constant -4.439 -5.463 -4.539 -5.162
(3.991) (3.985) (3.891) (3.965)
Observations 1433 1431 1433 1431
Country Fixed Effects X X X X
Country clustered standard errors in parentheses∗ p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01
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Table 51: The Effect of Political Change During Previous Currency Crises upon Reserve
Accumulation Including Political Changes Two Years After the Crisis
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unweighted Weighted Unweighted Weighted
Lag of Log Reserves 0.811∗∗∗ 0.809∗∗∗ 0.805∗∗∗ 0.803∗∗∗
(0.042) (0.042) (0.044) (0.045)
Major Cabinet Changes 0.029 0.005
(0.048) (0.034)
Change in Effective Executive 0.005 0.012
(0.034) (0.036)
Polity 2 Score 0.005∗ 0.005∗ 0.005∗ 0.005∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
IMF Program During Previous Crisis 0.003 0.005 0.004 0.003
(0.031) (0.031) (0.032) (0.032)
Imports (% GDP) -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Trade Balance (Exports - Imports % GDP) 0.015∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Central Bank Independence 0.014 0.013 0.016 0.016
(0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016)
Presidential System 0.079 0.081 0.078 0.080
(0.073) (0.074) (0.076) (0.076)
GDP per capita (natural log) -0.104∗ -0.101 -0.106 -0.104
(0.061) (0.063) (0.065) (0.067)
GDP growth -0.008∗∗ -0.009∗∗ -0.008∗ -0.008∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Population (natural log) 0.456∗ 0.461∗ 0.412∗ 0.420∗
(0.231) (0.234) (0.235) (0.240)
Capital Account Openness -0.016 -0.016 -0.018 -0.017
(0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014)
Currency Peg 0.021 0.022 0.020 0.021
(0.037) (0.037) (0.038) (0.038)
Currency Crisis -0.122∗∗∗ -0.122∗∗∗ -0.120∗∗∗ -0.120∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.030) (0.031) (0.031)
Time Trend -0.003 -0.003 -0.001 -0.002
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Constant -6.566 -6.626 -5.791 -5.930
(4.045) (4.097) (4.084) (4.184)
Observations 1439 1430 1378 1369
Country Fixed Effects X X X X
Country clustered standard errors in parentheses∗ p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01
95
Table 52: The Effect of Political Change During Previous Currency Crises That Lasted
Five Years or Less upon Reserve Accumulation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unweighted Weighted Unweighted Weighted
Lag of Log Reserves 0.789∗∗∗ 0.787∗∗∗ 0.788∗∗∗ 0.782∗∗∗
(0.044) (0.045) (0.044) (0.045)
Major Cabinet Change 0.030 0.049∗∗
(0.032) (0.024)
Change in Effective Executive 0.058 0.083∗∗
(0.035) (0.034)
Polity 2 Score 0.007∗∗ 0.007∗∗ 0.007∗∗ 0.007∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
IMF Program During Previous Crisis 0.009 0.011 0.003 0.007
(0.038) (0.037) (0.040) (0.039)
Imports (% GDP) -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Trade Balance (Exports - Imports % GDP) 0.017∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Central Bank Independence 0.019 0.018 0.020 0.017
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
Presidential System 0.069 0.077 0.076 0.093
(0.079) (0.078) (0.080) (0.079)
GDP per capita (natural log) -0.092 -0.084 -0.089 -0.080
(0.056) (0.057) (0.057) (0.059)
GDP growth -0.008∗ -0.008∗ -0.008∗ -0.008∗
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Population (natural log) 0.232 0.272 0.224 0.261
(0.250) (0.251) (0.244) (0.249)
Capital Account Openness -0.020 -0.018 -0.020 -0.018
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Currency Peg 0.040 0.036 0.036 0.038
(0.044) (0.044) (0.043) (0.044)
Currency Crisis -0.102∗∗∗ -0.105∗∗∗ -0.102∗∗∗ -0.107∗∗∗
(0.033) (0.031) (0.032) (0.032)
Time Trend 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
Constant -3.021 -3.723 -2.906 -3.569
(4.279) (4.314) (4.202) (4.292)
Observations 1190 1188 1190 1188
Country Fixed Effects X X X X
Country clustered standard errors in parentheses∗ p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01
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Table 53: The Effect of Political Change During Previous Currency Crises That Lasted
Five Years or Less upon Reserve Accumulation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unweighted Weighted Unweighted Weighted
Lag of Log Reserves 0.787∗∗∗ 0.785∗∗∗ 0.787∗∗∗ 0.781∗∗∗
(0.042) (0.043) (0.043) (0.044)
Major Cabinet Change 0.003 0.028
(0.052) (0.043)
Change in Effective Executive 0.036 0.068
(0.054) (0.054)
# Crises in Region During Previous Crisis -0.018 -0.016 -0.016 -0.017
(0.015) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012)
Major Cabinet Change × # Crises in Region During Previous Crisis 0.011 0.009
(0.013) (0.010)
Change in Effective Executive × # Crises in Region During Previous Crisis 0.009 0.009
(0.012) (0.011)
Polity 2 Score 0.007∗∗ 0.007∗∗ 0.008∗∗ 0.007∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
IMF Program During Previous Crisis 0.010 0.012 0.002 0.008
(0.038) (0.037) (0.039) (0.039)
Imports (% GDP) -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Trade Balance (Exports - Imports % GDP) 0.017∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Central Bank Independence 0.022 0.021 0.024 0.021
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
Presidential System 0.072 0.081 0.079 0.097
(0.082) (0.081) (0.083) (0.082)
GDP per capita (natural log) -0.096∗ -0.088 -0.094 -0.085
(0.056) (0.057) (0.056) (0.059)
GDP growth -0.008∗ -0.008∗ -0.008∗ -0.008∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
Population (natural log) 0.197 0.244 0.187 0.226
(0.255) (0.256) (0.250) (0.254)
Capital Account Openness -0.021 -0.019 -0.022 -0.020
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Currency Peg 0.040 0.036 0.036 0.039
(0.045) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044)
Currency Crisis -0.100∗∗∗ -0.104∗∗∗ -0.101∗∗∗ -0.106∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.031) (0.032) (0.031)
Time Trend 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.002
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Constant -2.388 -3.225 -2.255 -2.961
(4.380) (4.407) (4.301) (4.384)
Observations 1190 1188 1190 1188
Country Fixed Effects X X X X
Country clustered standard errors in parentheses∗ p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01
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Table 54: The Effect of Political Change During Previous Currency Crises That Lasted
Five Years or Less upon Reserve Accumulation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unweighted Weighted Unweighted Weighted
Lag of Log Reserves 0.775∗∗∗ 0.772∗∗∗ 0.786∗∗∗ 0.780∗∗∗
(0.046) (0.046) (0.045) (0.045)
Major Cabinet Change 0.018 0.047
(0.034) (0.029)
Change in Effective Executive 0.036 0.065∗
(0.035) (0.035)
GDP Change During Previous Crisis -0.058 -0.086 -0.023 -0.070
(0.163) (0.097) (0.122) (0.101)
Major Cabinet Change × GDP Change During Previous Crisis 0.122 0.282∗∗
(0.164) (0.132)
Change in Effective Executive × GDP Change During Previous Crisis 0.036 0.261
(0.138) (0.165)
Polity 2 Score 0.005∗ 0.005 0.006∗ 0.006∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
IMF Program During Previous Crisis 0.029 0.025 0.007 0.006
(0.037) (0.035) (0.040) (0.039)
Imports (% GDP) -0.003∗ -0.003∗ -0.003 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Trade Balance (Exports - Imports % GDP) 0.017∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Central Bank Independence -0.002 -0.004 0.010 0.008
(0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018)
Presidential System 0.033 0.065 0.075 0.110
(0.066) (0.065) (0.082) (0.081)
GDP per capita (natural log) -0.105∗ -0.105∗ -0.086 -0.085
(0.062) (0.061) (0.062) (0.062)
GDP growth -0.008 -0.008 -0.010∗∗ -0.009∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Population (natural log) 0.417 0.412 0.378 0.393
(0.276) (0.269) (0.263) (0.263)
Capital Account Openness -0.022 -0.024 -0.024 -0.025
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Currency Peg 0.061 0.063 0.038 0.045
(0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045)
Currency Crisis -0.095∗∗∗ -0.102∗∗∗ -0.099∗∗∗ -0.104∗∗∗
(0.033) (0.033) (0.032) (0.032)
Time Trend -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Constant -5.902 -5.862 -5.435 -5.724
(4.726) (4.622) (4.539) (4.544)
Observations 1140 1140 1164 1164
Country Fixed Effects X X X X
Country clustered standard errors in parentheses∗ p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01
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Table 55: The Effect of Political Change During Previous Currency Crises That Lasted
Five Years or Less upon Reserve Accumulation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unweighted Unweighted Weighted Weighted
Lag of Log Reserves 0.787∗∗∗ 0.793∗∗∗ 0.778∗∗∗ 0.788∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.039) (0.040) (0.039)
Major Cabinet Change 0.029 0.059
(0.084) (0.064)
Change in Effective Executive -0.040 0.032
(0.066) (0.065)
Reserves Spent During Previous Crisis 0.337∗∗ 0.233∗∗ 0.322∗∗∗ 0.246∗∗
(0.132) (0.105) (0.100) (0.093)
Pre-Crisis Reserves -0.061 -0.047 -0.059 -0.048
(0.044) (0.032) (0.037) (0.031)
Major Cabinet Change × Reserves Spent -0.236 -0.212∗∗
(0.143) (0.092)
Change in Effective Executive × Reserves Spent -0.117 -0.188∗
(0.119) (0.104)
Major Cabinet Change × Pre-Crisis Reserves 0.061 0.052
(0.063) (0.050)
Change in Effective Executive × Pre-Crisis Reserves 0.092∗ 0.064
(0.046) (0.049)
Reserves Spent × Pre-Crisis Reserves -0.255∗∗ -0.116∗ -0.295∗∗∗ -0.165∗∗
(0.126) (0.069) (0.089) (0.072)
Major Cabinet Change × Reserves Spent × Pre-Crisis Reserves 0.196 0.243∗∗∗
(0.135) (0.090)
Change in Effective Executive × Reserves Spent × Pre-Crisis Reserves 0.036 0.152∗
(0.084) (0.086)
Polity 2 Score 0.005 0.006 0.005 0.006
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
IMF Program During Previous Crisis -0.024 -0.014 -0.011 -0.012
(0.034) (0.032) (0.032) (0.034)
Imports (% GDP) -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Trade Balance (Exports - Imports % GDP) 0.019∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Central Bank Independence 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.013
(0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
Presidential System 0.083 0.091 0.112 0.101
(0.079) (0.083) (0.082) (0.082)
GDP per capita (natural log) -0.122∗ -0.122∗ -0.113∗ -0.110
(0.064) (0.068) (0.066) (0.070)
GDP growth -0.009∗∗ -0.009∗∗ -0.009∗∗ -0.010∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Population (natural log) 0.091 0.088 0.130 0.108
(0.313) (0.310) (0.306) (0.309)
Capital Account Openness -0.018 -0.020 -0.015 -0.019
(0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019)
Currency Peg 0.007 0.007 0.021 0.016
(0.053) (0.054) (0.053) (0.052)
Currency Crisis -0.105∗∗∗ -0.111∗∗∗ -0.115∗∗∗ -0.113∗∗∗
(0.036) (0.035) (0.034) (0.035)
Time Trend 0.008 0.007 0.007 0.006
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Constant -0.865 -0.739 -1.718 -1.244
(6.167) (6.173) (6.042) (6.161)
Observations 1091 1091 1091 1091
Country Fixed Effects X X X X
Country clustered standard errors in parentheses∗ p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01
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Table 56: The Effect of Political Change During Previous Currency Crises That Lasted
Five Years or Less upon Reserve Accumulation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unweighted Weighted Unweighted Weighted
Lag of Log Reserves 0.757∗∗∗ 0.755∗∗∗ 0.757∗∗∗ 0.749∗∗∗
(0.052) (0.052) (0.053) (0.053)
Major Cabinet Change -0.006 0.006
(0.039) (0.023)
Real Interest Rate Differential -0.120 0.015 -0.203 -0.003
(0.262) (0.051) (0.308) (0.065)
Major Cabinet Change × Real Interest Rate Differential 0.019 -0.300∗
(0.271) (0.150)
Change in Effective Executive 0.044 0.046
(0.042) (0.038)
Change in Effective Executive × Real Interest Rate Differential 0.107 -0.263∗
(0.311) (0.137)
Polity 2 Score 0.007∗ 0.007∗ 0.008∗∗ 0.007∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
IMF Program During Previous Crisis 0.010 0.016 0.002 0.012
(0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.039)
Imports (% GDP) -0.003∗ -0.003∗ -0.003 -0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Trade Balance (Exports - Imports % GDP) 0.016∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Central Bank Independence 0.007 0.007 0.008 0.009
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
Presidential System 0.090 0.085 0.090 0.100
(0.077) (0.079) (0.076) (0.079)
GDP per capita (natural log) -0.058 -0.062 -0.060 -0.055
(0.062) (0.063) (0.062) (0.066)
GDP growth -0.008∗ -0.009∗ -0.008 -0.008∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Population (natural log) 0.366 0.388 0.360 0.366
(0.297) (0.302) (0.301) (0.297)
Capital Account Openness -0.022 -0.018 -0.021 -0.021
(0.016) (0.016) (0.018) (0.016)
Currency Peg 0.027 0.022 0.023 0.023
(0.047) (0.048) (0.047) (0.048)
Currency Crisis -0.113∗∗∗ -0.119∗∗∗ -0.111∗∗∗ -0.120∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.033)
Time Trend -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008)
Constant -5.402 -5.745 -5.336 -5.437
(5.061) (5.156) (5.146) (5.099)
Observations 1030 1028 1030 1028
Country Fixed Effects X X X X
Country clustered standard errors in parentheses∗ p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01
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Table 57: The Effect of Political Change During Previous Currency Crises That Lasted
Five Years or Less upon Reserve Accumulation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unweighted Weighted Unweighted Weighted
Lag of Log Reserves 0.789∗∗∗ 0.787∗∗∗ 0.788∗∗∗ 0.782∗∗∗
(0.044) (0.045) (0.044) (0.045)
Major Cabinet Change 0.034 0.036
(0.032) (0.036)
Central Bank Independence 0.016 0.025 0.013 0.016
(0.024) (0.022) (0.019) (0.019)
Major Cabinet Change × Central Bank Independence 0.005 -0.017
(0.029) (0.036)
Change in Effective Executive 0.072∗ 0.086∗
(0.039) (0.047)
Change in Effective Executive × Central Bank Independence 0.017 0.004
(0.031) (0.041)
Polity 2 Score 0.007∗∗ 0.007∗∗ 0.007∗∗ 0.007∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
IMF Program During Previous Crisis 0.009 0.012 0.001 0.007
(0.039) (0.039) (0.040) (0.039)
Imports (% GDP) -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Trade Balance (Exports - Imports % GDP) 0.017∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Presidential System 0.068 0.080 0.078 0.093
(0.079) (0.078) (0.079) (0.079)
GDP per capita (natural log) -0.092 -0.083 -0.089 -0.080
(0.056) (0.057) (0.057) (0.059)
GDP growth -0.008∗ -0.008∗ -0.008∗ -0.008∗
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Population (natural log) 0.233 0.278 0.228 0.260
(0.251) (0.249) (0.243) (0.249)
Capital Account Openness -0.020 -0.018 -0.021 -0.018
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Currency Peg 0.040 0.035 0.037 0.038
(0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044)
Currency Crisis -0.102∗∗∗ -0.105∗∗∗ -0.102∗∗∗ -0.107∗∗∗
(0.033) (0.031) (0.032) (0.032)
Time Trend 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
Constant -3.046 -3.828 -2.994 -3.559
(4.305) (4.283) (4.187) (4.294)
Observations 1190 1188 1190 1188
Country Fixed Effects X X X X
Country clustered standard errors in parentheses∗ p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01
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Table 58: The Effect of Political Change During Previous Currency Crises upon Reserve
Accumulation Controlling For The Length of the Previous Currency Crisis
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unweighted Weighted Unweighted Weighted
Lag of Log Reserves 0.785∗∗∗ 0.782∗∗∗ 0.785∗∗∗ 0.780∗∗∗
(0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.044)
Major Cabinet Change 0.035 0.054∗∗
(0.031) (0.023)
Change in Effective Executive 0.054∗ 0.075∗∗
(0.032) (0.031)
Polity 2 Score 0.007∗∗ 0.007∗∗ 0.007∗∗ 0.007∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
IMF Program During Previous Crisis 0.012 0.014 0.007 0.010
(0.035) (0.035) (0.037) (0.037)
Imports (% GDP) -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Trade Balance (Exports - Imports % GDP) 0.017∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Central Bank Independence 0.025 0.024 0.027 0.024
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
Presidential System 0.068 0.078 0.075 0.091
(0.078) (0.077) (0.079) (0.078)
GDP per capita (natural log) -0.086 -0.078 -0.084 -0.077
(0.052) (0.054) (0.053) (0.055)
GDP growth -0.008∗ -0.008∗ -0.008∗ -0.008∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Population (natural log) 0.267 0.305 0.257 0.288
(0.238) (0.240) (0.235) (0.238)
Capital Account Openness -0.019 -0.018 -0.019 -0.018
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Currency Peg 0.028 0.024 0.026 0.028
(0.042) (0.042) (0.041) (0.041)
Currency Crisis -0.112∗∗∗ -0.116∗∗∗ -0.113∗∗∗ -0.117∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.030) (0.031) (0.030)
Time Trend 0.001 -0.000 0.001 -0.000
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Length of Previous Currency Crisis -0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.000
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Constant -3.627 -4.303 -3.478 -4.031
(4.070) (4.115) (4.024) (4.090)
Observations 1284 1282 1284 1282
Country Fixed Effects X X X X
Country clustered standard errors in parentheses∗ p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01
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Table 59: The Effect of Political Change During Previous Currency Crises upon Reserve
Accumulation Controlling For The Length of the Previous Currency Crisis
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unweighted Weighted Unweighted Weighted
Lag of Log Reserves 0.783∗∗∗ 0.780∗∗∗ 0.783∗∗∗ 0.778∗∗∗
(0.041) (0.042) (0.042) (0.043)
Major Cabinet Change 0.012 0.032
(0.050) (0.042)
Change in Effective Executive 0.040 0.066
(0.049) (0.050)
# Currency Crises in Region During Prev. Crisis -0.015 -0.016 -0.013 -0.015
(0.014) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011)
Major Cabinet Changes × # Crises in Region 0.009 0.010
(0.012) (0.010)
Change in Effective Executive × # Crises in Region 0.006 0.006
(0.011) (0.010)
Polity 2 Score 0.007∗∗ 0.007∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
IMF Program During Previous Crisis 0.013 0.014 0.005 0.009
(0.035) (0.035) (0.037) (0.036)
Imports (% GDP) -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Trade Balance (Exports - Imports % GDP) 0.017∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Central Bank Independence 0.027 0.026 0.029∗ 0.027
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
Presidential System 0.071 0.081 0.078 0.094
(0.081) (0.080) (0.082) (0.081)
GDP per capita (natural log) -0.089∗ -0.081 -0.087 -0.080
(0.052) (0.054) (0.053) (0.054)
GDP growth -0.008∗ -0.008∗ -0.008∗ -0.008∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Population (natural log) 0.237 0.279 0.226 0.257
(0.244) (0.244) (0.241) (0.243)
Capital Account Openness -0.021 -0.019 -0.021 -0.020
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Currency Peg 0.028 0.024 0.026 0.030
(0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042)
Currency Crisis -0.111∗∗∗ -0.114∗∗∗ -0.111∗∗∗ -0.115∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030)
Time Trend 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Length of Previous Currency Crisis -0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Constant -3.077 -3.833 -2.924 -3.477
(4.178) (4.205) (4.134) (4.191)
Observations 1284 1282 1284 1282
Country Fixed Effects X X X X
Country clustered standard errors in parentheses∗ p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01
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Table 60: The Effect of Political Change During Previous Currency Crises upon Reserve
Accumulation Controlling For The Length of the Previous Currency Crisis
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unweighted Weighted Unweighted Weighted
lag log fi res totl mo 0.772∗∗∗ 0.768∗∗∗ 0.783∗∗∗ 0.778∗∗∗
(0.045) (0.045) (0.043) (0.043)
Major Cabinet Change 0.024 0.051∗
(0.032) (0.027)
GDP Change During Previous Crisis -0.072 -0.111 -0.017 -0.075
(0.161) (0.096) (0.118) (0.098)
Major Cabinet Changes × GDP Change During Prev. Crisis 0.118 0.311∗∗
(0.158) (0.130)
Change in Effective Executive 0.033 0.058∗
(0.032) (0.032)
Change in Effective Executive × GDP Change During Prev. Crisis 0.013 0.254
(0.131) (0.162)
Polity 2 Score 0.005∗ 0.005 0.006∗ 0.006∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
IMF Program During Previous Crisis 0.029 0.026 0.010 0.008
(0.034) (0.032) (0.038) (0.037)
Imports (% GDP) -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Trade Balance (Exports - Imports % GDP) 0.016∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Central Bank Independence 0.006 0.004 0.017 0.015
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Presidential System 0.033 0.068 0.073 0.107
(0.065) (0.065) (0.081) (0.080)
GDP per capita (natural log) -0.096 -0.095 -0.081 -0.081
(0.058) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057)
GDP growth -0.008∗ -0.008∗ -0.010∗∗ -0.010∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
Population (natural log) 0.445∗ 0.448∗ 0.400 0.415
(0.263) (0.258) (0.252) (0.253)
Capital Account Openness -0.021 -0.023 -0.023 -0.024∗
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Currency Peg 0.047 0.050 0.028 0.035
(0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042)
Currency Crisis -0.106∗∗∗ -0.114∗∗∗ -0.110∗∗∗ -0.114∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.032) (0.031) (0.031)
Time Trend -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Length of Previous Currency Crisis 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Constant -6.426 -6.513 -5.828 -6.100
(4.508) (4.424) (4.334) (4.354)
Observations 1234 1234 1258 1258
Country Fixed Effects X X X X
Country clustered standard errors in parentheses∗ p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01
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Table 61: The Effect of Political Change During Previous Currency Crises upon Reserve
Accumulation Controlling For The Length of the Previous Currency Crisis
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unweighted Unweighted Weighted Weighted
Lag of Log Reserves 0.787∗∗∗ 0.791∗∗∗ 0.781∗∗∗ 0.792∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038)
Major Cabinet Change 0.024 0.073
(0.081) (0.059)
Change in Effective Executive -0.024 0.063
(0.064) (0.064)
Reserves Spent During Previous Crisis 0.316∗∗ 0.219∗∗ 0.241∗∗∗ 0.183∗∗
(0.132) (0.102) (0.084) (0.075)
Pre-Crisis Reserves -0.061 -0.041 -0.045 -0.034
(0.044) (0.032) (0.036) (0.030)
Major Cabinet Change × Reserves Spent -0.268∗ -0.199∗∗
(0.147) (0.086)
Change in Eff. Exec. × Reserves Spent -0.186 -0.207∗
(0.123) (0.106)
Major Cabinet Change × Pre-Crisis Reserves 0.059 0.032
(0.061) (0.046)
Change in Eff. Exec. × Pre-Crisis Reserves 0.070 0.022
(0.046) (0.048)
Reserves Spent × Pre-Crisis Reserves -0.247∗ -0.091 -0.233∗∗∗ -0.099∗
(0.128) (0.060) (0.080) (0.053)
Major Cabinet Change × Reserves Spent × Pre-Crisis Reserves 0.229∗ 0.229∗∗∗
(0.136) (0.085)
Change in Eff. Exec. × Reserves Spent × Pre-Crisis Reserves 0.072 0.144
(0.085) (0.088)
Polity 2 Score 0.006 0.008∗ 0.007∗ 0.008∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
IMF Program During Previous Crisis -0.025 -0.020 -0.013 -0.020
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.033)
Imports (% GDP) -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Trade Balance (Exports - Imports % GDP) 0.018∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Central Bank Independence 0.024 0.025 0.027 0.024
(0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018)
Presidential System 0.078 0.089 0.100 0.091
(0.079) (0.083) (0.081) (0.083)
GDP per capita (natural log) -0.133∗∗ -0.133∗∗ -0.137∗∗ -0.134∗∗
(0.058) (0.064) (0.062) (0.066)
GDP growth -0.008∗∗ -0.009∗∗ -0.009∗∗ -0.009∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Population (natural log) 0.135 0.110 0.149 0.106
(0.288) (0.290) (0.283) (0.291)
Capital Account Openness -0.013 -0.016 -0.012 -0.015
(0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018)
Currency Peg 0.000 -0.002 0.023 0.015
(0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.048)
Currency Crisis -0.116∗∗∗ -0.124∗∗∗ -0.125∗∗∗ -0.126∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.035) (0.032) (0.034)
Time Trend 0.007 0.006 0.007 0.006
(0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008)
Length of Previous Currency Crisis 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.001
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Constant -1.606 -1.072 -1.888 -0.998
(5.632) (5.743) (5.549) (5.761)
Observations 1185 1185 1185 1185
Country Fixed Effects X X X X
Country clustered standard errors in parentheses∗ p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01
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Table 62: The Effect of Political Change During Previous Currency Crises upon Reserve
Accumulation Controlling For The Length of the Previous Currency Crisis
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unweighted Weighted Unweighted Weighted
Lag of Log Reserves 0.757∗∗∗ 0.755∗∗∗ 0.758∗∗∗ 0.750∗∗∗
(0.050) (0.050) (0.051) (0.051)
Major Cabinet Change -0.005 0.010
(0.039) (0.022)
Change in Effective Executive 0.041 0.041
(0.040) (0.036)
Real Interest Rate Differential -0.129 0.013 -0.198 -0.002
(0.256) (0.049) (0.298) (0.065)
Major Cabinet Change × Real Interest Rate Differential 0.026 -0.297∗∗
(0.265) (0.148)
Change in Effective Executive × Real Interest Rate Differential 0.100 -0.271∗
(0.301) (0.136)
Polity 2 Score 0.008∗∗ 0.008∗∗ 0.008∗∗ 0.007∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
IMF Program During Previous Crisis 0.008 0.013 -0.000 0.008
(0.036) (0.035) (0.036) (0.037)
Imports (% GDP) -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Trade Balance (Exports - Imports % GDP) 0.016∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Central Bank Independence 0.012 0.013 0.014 0.014
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
Presidential System 0.091 0.086 0.091 0.100
(0.077) (0.078) (0.076) (0.079)
GDP per capita (natural log) -0.062 -0.065 -0.064 -0.060
(0.059) (0.061) (0.060) (0.063)
GDP growth -0.009∗ -0.009∗ -0.008∗ -0.009∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Population (natural log) 0.371 0.392 0.365 0.372
(0.287) (0.293) (0.291) (0.286)
Capital Account Openness -0.021 -0.018 -0.021 -0.021
(0.015) (0.016) (0.017) (0.015)
Currency Peg 0.022 0.017 0.018 0.018
(0.046) (0.047) (0.046) (0.047)
Currency Crisis -0.115∗∗∗ -0.120∗∗∗ -0.113∗∗∗ -0.122∗∗∗
(0.033) (0.032) (0.033) (0.032)
Time Trend -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Length of Previous Currency Crisis -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Constant -5.464 -5.780 -5.381 -5.485
(4.894) (4.998) (4.966) (4.913)
Observations 1101 1099 1101 1099
Country Fixed Effects X X X X
Country clustered standard errors in parentheses∗ p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01
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Table 63: The Effect of Political Change During Previous Currency Crises upon Reserve
Accumulation Controlling For The Length of the Previous Currency Crisis
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unweighted Weighted Unweighted Weighted
Lag of Log Reserves 0.785∗∗∗ 0.782∗∗∗ 0.785∗∗∗ 0.780∗∗∗
(0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.044)
Major Cabinet Change 0.032 0.039
(0.032) (0.035)
Change in Effective Executive 0.057 0.072
(0.037) (0.043)
Central Bank Independence 0.029 0.033 0.025 0.025
(0.024) (0.021) (0.017) (0.017)
Major Cabinet Change × Central Bank Independence -0.005 -0.019
(0.028) (0.033)
Change in Effective Executive × Central Bank Independence 0.003 -0.004
(0.029) (0.036)
Polity 2 Score 0.007∗∗ 0.007∗∗ 0.007∗∗ 0.007∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
IMF Program During Previous Crisis 0.013 0.016 0.007 0.010
(0.036) (0.036) (0.038) (0.038)
Imports (% GDP) -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Trade Balance (Exports - Imports % GDP) 0.017∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Presidential System 0.069 0.081 0.076 0.091
(0.078) (0.077) (0.079) (0.079)
GDP per capita (natural log) -0.086 -0.076 -0.084 -0.077
(0.052) (0.054) (0.053) (0.055)
GDP growth -0.008∗ -0.008∗ -0.008∗ -0.008∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Population (natural log) 0.266 0.313 0.258 0.289
(0.238) (0.238) (0.234) (0.238)
Capital Account Openness -0.019 -0.018 -0.019 -0.018
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Currency Peg 0.027 0.024 0.026 0.028
(0.041) (0.042) (0.041) (0.041)
Currency Crisis -0.112∗∗∗ -0.116∗∗∗ -0.113∗∗∗ -0.117∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.030) (0.031) (0.030)
Time Trend 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.000
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Length of Previous Currency Crisis -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Constant -3.604 -4.434 -3.496 -4.038
(4.082) (4.086) (4.008) (4.096)
Observations 1284 1282 1284 1282
Country Fixed Effects X X X X
Country clustered standard errors in parentheses∗ p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01
107
Table 64: Error Correction Model for the Effect of Political Change During Previous
Currency Crises upon Reserve Accumulation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unweighted Weighted Unweighted Weighted
Lag of Log of Reserves -0.183∗∗∗ -0.186∗∗∗ -0.180∗∗∗ -0.186∗∗∗
(0.036) (0.036) (0.035) (0.036)
∆ Major Cabinet Change 0.112∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗
(0.041) (0.030)
Lag of Major Cabinet Change 0.028 0.048∗∗
(0.026) (0.024)
∆ Change in Effective Executive 0.159∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗
(0.046) (0.043)
Lag of Change in Effective Executive 0.026 0.046
(0.027) (0.029)
∆ Polity 2 Score 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.000
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Lag of Polity 2 Score 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.003
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
∆ IMF Program During Previous Crisis 0.087 0.090 0.062 0.077
(0.054) (0.054) (0.052) (0.054)
Lag of IMF Program During Previous Crisis -0.028 -0.028 -0.028 -0.029
(0.031) (0.030) (0.032) (0.032)
∆ Imports (% GDP) -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Lag of Imports (% GDP) -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
∆ Trade Balance (Exports - Imports % GDP) 0.025∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Lag of Trade Balance (Exports - Imports % GDP) 0.007∗∗ 0.007∗∗ 0.007∗∗ 0.007∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
∆ Central Bank Independence -0.002 -0.005 -0.004 -0.005
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
Lag of Central Bank Independence 0.011 0.010 0.010 0.009
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
∆ Presidential System 0.025 0.033 0.023 0.038
(0.117) (0.116) (0.117) (0.117)
Lag of Presidential System 0.106∗ 0.108∗ 0.111∗ 0.113∗
(0.060) (0.059) (0.060) (0.059)
∆ GDP per capita (natural log) 0.064 0.063 0.057 0.061
(0.094) (0.095) (0.096) (0.096)
Lag of GDP per capita (natural log) -0.067 -0.059 -0.068 -0.059
(0.048) (0.049) (0.048) (0.049)
∆ GDP growth -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Lag of GDP growth -0.005 -0.006 -0.005 -0.006
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
∆ Population (natural log) -6.843 -7.154∗ -6.968∗ -7.305∗
(4.115) (4.101) (4.081) (4.060)
Lag of Population (natural log) 0.304 0.343 0.293 0.330
(0.217) (0.220) (0.209) (0.215)
∆ Capital Account Openness 0.027 0.027 0.025 0.027
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
Lag of Capital Account Openness -0.023∗ -0.022∗ -0.023∗ -0.022
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
∆ Currency Peg 0.048 0.050 0.051 0.056
(0.049) (0.048) (0.048) (0.047)
Lag of Currency Peg 0.011 0.005 0.010 0.007
(0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036)
∆ Currency Crisis -0.129∗∗∗ -0.137∗∗∗ -0.127∗∗∗ -0.136∗∗∗
(0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033)
Lag of Currency Crisis -0.074∗∗ -0.077∗∗ -0.073∗∗ -0.075∗∗
(0.032) (0.031) (0.033) (0.031)
Time Trend -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Constant -4.244 -4.925 -4.045 -4.693
(3.771) (3.838) (3.643) (3.755)
Observations 1432 1430 1432 1430
Country Fixed Effects X X X X
Country clustered standard errors in parentheses∗ p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01
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